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WHY STATES FOLLOW THE RULES: TOWARD
A POSITIONAL THEORY OF ADHERENCE TO
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES
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INTRODUCTION
There is not and never will be a “field theory” of international law
and relations that succeeds in explaining individual or state conduct
so completely as to permit the reliable prediction of specific state
actions that will occur in distant, concrete circumstances. We cannot
know whether the conditions necessary for cooperation will be
present in the future, or how states will respond to the conditions that
1
do exist.

So opined Professor Michael J. Glennon in his recent article
2
Given the messy reality of
How International Rules Die.
international relations, Glennon argues that we can never really know
3
why states follow rules of international law, which is true enough.
We cannot enter into the minds of the policymakers. We can never
know with absolute certainty why decision makers chose to sign,
ratify, and follow the provisions of international legal regimes. But if
international relations theory is to serve any useful purpose, it must
seek to make some kind of evaluation—even if it is a contingent,
imperfect one—of why states act as they do. Without such
evaluation, there can be no framework for understanding the
behavior of international actors and no guidance for policymakers.
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3. See id.
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We believe that the problem lies not so much in the general
project of political science, but rather in the nature of existing
theories of international relations and international law. Each of the
major theories—structural realism, modified structuralism, neoliberal
institutionalism, and constructivism—offers some insights into state
behavior, but none is able to provide a comprehensive framework for
understanding state behavior regarding international legal regimes.
What is needed is a better theory, and that is what we have sought to
formulate.
To respond to the failure of existing theories, we have developed
a new theory that we refer to as the “positional theory of adherence.”
This theory provides a much stronger basis for understanding why
states adhere to international legal regimes. This positional theory
has been developed inductively through an examination in which we
explore the participation of nineteen global and regional powers in
four prominent treaty regimes: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), the Land Mine Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, and the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Based on
this examination, we conclude that the most significant determinants
of behavior are the position of that state in the international system as
well as the nature of the treaty regime, the extent to which the regime
infringes on state sovereignty, the nature of verification/enforcement
arrangements of that regime, and the normativity of the treaty
regime.
This Article seeks to lay out the nature of our empirical study
and to set forth the basic elements of this new theory. Part I develops
the concept of “adherence” and explore insights from traditional
international relations theory and international legal theory relating
to adherence. Part II discusses the methodology used in our
investigation, including the case and country selection. Part III then
provides a detailed examination of the motivations given by these
states for adherence with respect to the four treaties. Concluding that
traditional theories by themselves fail to predict adherence, Part IV
lays out the contours of our positional theory of adherence. Finally,
Part V examines the implications of this theory for foreign
policymaking.
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I. ADHERENCE THEORY
A. The Concept of Adherence
4

Many international legal and relations scholars have written
5
about the concept of “compliance.” Compliance is meant to reflect
the actions of a state to follow the provisions of a particular treaty or
6
rule of customary international law. A state is said to be complying
with a treaty or rule of customary international law if it is acting in
accordance with the legal obligations established in that particular
source of law. But state participation in an international legal regime
is actually more complex. For example, the United States decided in
1982 to neither sign, nor ratify the Law of the Sea Convention,7 but to
8
abide by it in part. President Reagan announced in 1983 that the
United States would accept and abide by the provisions of the
Convention dealing with “traditional uses of the ocean” including
navigation over-flight vis-à-vis other states that agree to follow those
provisions.9 Reagan’s primary reservation was with regard to the
4. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS passim (Harvard Univ.
Press 1995) (developing a theory of compliance); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS passim (Clarendon Press 1995); Claire R. Kelly,
Enmeshment as a Theory of Compliance, 37 N.Y. U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 303 (2005); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (reviewing
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)); Beth A.
Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money?, 25
YALE J. INT’L L. 323 passim (2000); Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of
International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 passim (2002). See also ANTHONY CLARK AREND,
LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY passim (Oxford Univ. Press 1999); Anthony
Clark Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics, 38 VA. J.
INT’L L. 107 passim (1998).
5. Professor William Bradford has argued that there is a growing “subfield” of
international law that addresses the issue of compliance. William Bradford, International Legal
Compliance: Surveying the Field, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 495 passim (2005).
6. Kal Raustiala notes that “[c]ompliance generally refers to a state of conformity or
identity between an actor’s behavior and specified rule.” Kal Raustiala, Compliance &
Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387, 391
(2000).
7. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 136, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention].
8. Much has been written on the United States and the 1982 Convention on the Law of
the Sea. See generally ROBERT L. FRIEDHEIM, NEGOTIATING THE NEW OCEANS REGIME
(Univ. of S.C. Press 1993) (providing general background information on the Law of the Sea
Convention); THE LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY DILEMMA (Bernard Oxman et al. eds., Inst.
for Contemp. Studies 1983).
9. In his statement released on March 10, 1983, Reagan explained that “the United States
will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the [Law of
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provisions for deep sea bed mining (Part XI),10 which he did not
consider to be customary law. His policy adhered to most but not all
of the Law of the Sea Convention, suggesting the non-binary nature
of participation in an international legal regime.
Given this non-binary nature of participation and the
problematic implications of the term “compliance,” a better word to
describe the relationship between a state and a treaty regime—or rule
of
customary
international
law—might
be
“adherence.”
“Adherence,” as the term is used here, means the level of
participation of a state in the treaty regime. Adherence is not a
binary concept.11 There is a spectrum along which participation in a
regime takes place. States may sign a treaty, ratify, fulfill the
provisions in varying degrees, and demonstrate varying degrees of
commitment to the treaty based in part on their institutional
investment, participation in the regime, and advocacy. They may also
sign or ratify as an expression of commitment, but not effect real
changes in their behavior.12 States may even fail to sign or ratify, yet
exhibit some level of adherence to provisions of the agreement. Any
state, at a given point in time, will fall somewhere along the spectrum
of adherence. By examining a variety of indicators, a general
evaluation of the level of adherence of that state can be determined.
In order to develop a new theory of adherence, it is necessary to
look at the reasons why states engage in these different levels of
participation. From a theoretical and empirical perspective, what
factors affect states’ decisions to participate along this spectrum? A
good starting point for this evaluation of state behavior and

the Sea] Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the United States and others under
international law are recognized by such coastal states.” United States Ocean Policy, 19
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 383-84 (Mar. 10, 1983).
10. Law of the Sea Convention, pt. XI (establishing a legal regime for the mining of deep
seabed nodules).
11. Using the term compliance, Chayes and Chayes clearly recognize this problem:
Compliance is not an on-off phenomenon. For a straightforward prohibitory norm like
a highway speed limit, it is in principle a simple matter to determine whether any
particular driver is in compliance. Yet there is a considerable zone within which
behavior is accepted as adequately conforming.
Most communities and law
enforcement organizations with the United States, at least, seem to be perfectly
comfortable with a situation in which the average speed on interstate highways is
perhaps ten miles above the limit. The problem for the system is not how to induce all
drivers to obey the speed limit, but how to contain deviance within acceptable levels.
And, so it is for international treaty obligations.
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 17 (internal citations omitted).
12. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE
L.J. 1935, 1962-63 (2002).
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motivations is an exploration of the traditional international relations
and legal theories.
B. Traditional Theories and Adherence
Over the years, scholars of both international relations and
international law have developed a wide variety of theories that can
offer insights about adherence. Using the basic assumptions and
13
arguments from several of the most prominent theories such as (1)
structural realism, (2) modified structuralism, (3) neoliberal
institutionalism, (4) hegemonic stability theory, and (5)
constructivism, certain propositions about adherence can be
developed.14
1. Structural Realism. One of the most persistent theories of
15
international relations is structural realism. Structural realists begin
with the assumption that states are the primary actors in the
international system, and that this system is “anarchic.” This does not
mean that there is total chaos in the relations among states, but rather
that there is “no common power,” no centralized governing system on
the international plane to establish order. This lack of a centralized
enforcement system means that states cannot trust other states to
behave in a way that will not threaten their security.16

13. At the outset, it should be noted that many international relations scholars do not
explicitly explore the relationship between international legal rules and state behavior. Instead,
these scholars often refer to the role of norms and institutions. Nonetheless, the basic contours
of these theories can also be applied specifically to international legal regimes as well.
14. Mainstream international relations literature has typically fallen into these five
theoretical camps. Although more recent works have tended to focus around specific issues
rather than theoretical schools, these theories are still considered the mainstream international
relations theories and offer a useful point of departure for our analysis. For more on the use of
mainstream theories as a framework for analysis, see Ole R. Holsti, Models of International
Relations and Foreign Policy, in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THEORETICAL ESSAYS, (G.
John Ikenberry ed., 2005).
15. While the theory of realism is often linked to Thucydides, in contemporary scholarship,
mid-twentieth century writers such as Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Reinhold Niebuhr,
and E.H. Carr are generally regarded as the founders of “classical realism.” See E.H. CARR,
THE TWENTY-YEAR CRISIS, 1919-1939 passim (2d ed. 1946); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE passim (5th ed. 1978); GEORGE F.
KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900-1950 (1951); REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND
IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS (1932). Structural realism is most
closely associated with the work of Kenneth Waltz. KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Addison-Wesley 1979). Structural realism is also referred to as
“neo-realism.”
16. This is drawn from title of Professor Robert J. Lieber’s book. ROBERT J. LIEBER, NO
COMMON POWER: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (4th ed. 2001).
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In game theory terms, structural realists see international
relations as inherently conflicting as in a game of Prisoner’s
17
Because anarchy creates uncertainty about the other
Dilemma.
side’s motives, the precautionary move is to defect from the rules to
preempt the other side from doing so first. Accordingly, a structural
realist would predict that international legal rules would not alter
states’ behavior and independently induce cooperation. In a system
in which states struggle for power and security, states will be
concerned not just with their absolute position in the system, but also
with their position relative to other states.18 Gain is zero-sum and
relative: advancement for one state means a relative loss for another,
making prospects for cooperation—in which all states might actually
gain—more difficult. The fear of defection is always present, creating
disincentives for states to modify their behavior to participate in
international treaty regimes. In the realist framework, institutions,
and thus international legal rules, are epiphenomenal and do not
independently “cause states to behave in ways they would otherwise
would not behave—for example, foregoing short-term, self-interest in
favor of long-term community goals.”19
Not only do institutions “matter only on the margins” according
to realists, but their development and composition are reflective of
the international distribution of power.20 International agreements
are struck by the most powerful states in the system and are favorable

17. William Aceves provides a succinct explanation of the game of Prisoner’s Dilemma:
The Prisoner’s Dilemma provides an even more formal model of the international
system and its effect on state behavior. The Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates how
competing interests between two egoistic actors can lead to sub-optimal behavior. The
Prisoner’s Dilemma is typically modeled as a 2 x 2 matrix. Each player has two
options: cooperate or defect. The respective payoffs received by the players will
depend upon the opposing player’s actions. The highest payoff for each player is
gained if she defects and the opposing player cooperates. Similarly, the lowest payoff,
referred to as the “sucker’s payoff,” is gained if she cooperates and the opposing
player defects. The Prisoner’s Dilemma contains four additional elements. First, there
is no mechanism for making enforceable threats or commitments. Second, there is no
way to ascertain what the other player will do. Third, there is no way to avoid
interaction with the other player. Fourth, the payoff structure cannot be altered.
William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U.J. INT’L
& POL’Y 227, 238-39 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
18. There is much in the international relations literature on the absolute gains versus
relative gains debate. See, e.g., Robert Powell, Absolute and Relative Gains in International
Relations Theory, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1303, 1303-20 (1991).
19. Randall Schweller & Daryl Preiss, A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions
Debate, 41 MERSHON INT’L STUD. REV. 1, 3 (1997).
20. John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SEC. 5, 7
(1995).
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to that set of actors.21 Realists see institutions as only temporarily
useful for achieving coordinated responses, such as NATO during the
Cold War. Once the raison d’etre behind the agreement disappears,
adherence will dissipate commensurately. Similarly, if state interests
change and become opposed to a particular agreement, adherence
will drop. States are under no obligation to cooperate longer than
their rational self-interest dictates.22
In short, a structural realist would predict that states would be
less inclined to adhere to international legal regimes,23 for fear that
there is no common government to monitor and enforce rules. In this
24
Hobbesian world, states are particularly ill-advised to adhere to
regimes that put a constraint on their ability to maximize security.
Autonomy to pursue state security is paramount interest, and any
agreement that infringes on their ability to do so is not advantageous
and should not be approved. In this sense, regimes that limit a state’s
ability to defend itself, such as constraints on a state’s ability to test
new weapons, or to use weapons that are considered by some parties
in the international system to be inhumane, will elicit low levels of
adherence. While structural realists would recognize that states might
sign and ratify an agreement for the sake of appearance, they would
predict that states will not follow the provisions of the agreement
when they perceive them to be inconvenient.

21. Id.
22. See John Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, 15
INT’L SEC. 5, 5, for a discussion of his realist views towards international institutions, in which he
argues that the institutionalized alliances of the Cold War only stuck together because of
rational self-interest.
23. One of the earliest definitions of regimes as the term has been used in the international
relations theory community comes from John Gerard Ruggie. Ruggie defined a regime as “a set
of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial
commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states.” John Gerard Ruggie,
International Response to Technology: Concepts and Trends, 29 INT’L ORG. 557, 570 (1975).
Perhaps the most common definition used in the literature today was developed by Stephen D.
Krasner. He defines regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of
international relations.” Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:
Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT’L ORG. 185, 186 (1982).
24. In his classic work, The Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes described the state of nature as one
of war of all against all in which life was “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” THOMAS
HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 65 (Dent 1973) (1651).
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2. Modified Structuralism. Modified structural realists,25 unlike
the structural realists, stake out a less extreme approach. While they
understand the problems inherent in anarchy, they believe that
institutions offer a degree of order and predictability that is
preferable to a completely unregulated international system. As a
consequence, states have incentives to bind themselves to
international legal regimes.26 Some scholars have argued that a major
factor affecting adherence is the nature of the issue area addressed by
the regime. Adherence to security regimes is less likely because the
costs of defection are potentially immediate and grave. In contrast,
economic or environmental regimes offer opportunities for joint gains
that would be difficult to achieve on a bilateral basis due to higher
transaction costs. Moreover, in the economic or environmental
realm, the cost of defection may be financially or environmentally
destructive, but not directly threatening to state survival. This
distinction between security regimes on the one hand, and economic
and environmental regimes on the other, has been referred to as
“high” and “low politics.”27 Modified structural realists would predict
a higher likelihood of adherence in low politics than in high politics.28
In addition to seeing a higher degree of institutionalized
behavior than structural realists, modified structural realists make a
distinction between the strongest states and either rising or weaker
states. Joseph Grieco has advanced a “voice opportunities” thesis in
which weaker states might enter into institutionalized agreements in
order to give them an opportunity to voice concerns, influence the
agenda, and have some impact on stronger states.29 This thesis might
25. Stephen D. Krasner introduces the idea of “modified structural realism” to contrast
with structural realism. Krasner, supra note 23, at 185-86. Randall Schweller and Daryl Preiss
add to this debate, bringing to bear the characteristics of states as a determinant of whether
global institutionalization can be attained. Schweller & Preiss, supra note 19 passim.
26. Krasner notes that regimes are more likely to emerge and elicit adherence than
structural realists would predict. Krasner, supra note 23, at 191-93. He notes, however, that
such behavior is contingent on the issue area that has been institutionalized, with security issues
acting more like the Prisoner’s Dilemma construct than economic issues. Id. at 195-96.
27. Matters of “high politics” are those that touch at the core security concerns of a state—
thus, security regimes would fall squarely into the realm of high politics. Matters of “low”
politics are those that do not relate to the core security concerns of a state. Typically, economic,
trade, and environmental issues are considered to fall within the realm of low politics.
28. See generally Robert Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding
the Debate, 24 INT’L SEC. 42 (1999); Charles Lipson, International Cooperation in Economic and
Security Affairs, 37 WORLD POL. 1 (1984).
29. Joseph M. Grieco, State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist
Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union, 5 SEC.
STUD., 261, 286-89.
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explain why weaker members of a group of strong states would
choose to bind themselves to international rules, while the strongest
states would hold out given that their power speaks strongly enough.
Accordingly, a modified structural realist might predict that
States would be more inclined to adhere to international agreements
in areas that fall more in the low politics range of the spectrum than
those that fall in the high politics range. They might also predict that
less powerful states might be more inclined to adhere to international
agreements if these agreements appear to grant “voice
opportunities.”
3. Hegemonic Stability Theory. Hegemonic stability theory
suggests that regime creation, maintenance, enforcement, and
durability are directly linked to a dominant power. Whether
regarding security or trade regimes, hegemonic stability theorists
argue that the concentration of power in one state means that the
hegemonic state can use its power to create institutions, use a
combination of carrots and sticks to gain cooperation from the
30
periphery, and generate order, so long as its own hegemony endures.
As a consequence, if a state—or even non-state actor, such as the
European Union—were behaving as a hegemon, this theory would
predict that the hegemonic state would adhere to regimes to mold
them into instruments through which to assert its power.
The theory has had traction with both classical and structural
realists. E.H. Carr noted that great power concentrated in one state
can create an international order, as the way the British Empire
31
created a period of pax Britannica. Charles Kindleberger echoed a
similar argument, but with respect to economic stability. Noting that
30. Some observers have claimed that this take on hegemonic stability offers an insufficient
explanation of hegemonic leadership, arguing that institutions endure longer than the
perpetuation of the hegemony itself. How else can the enduring institutional salience be
explained other than that non-structural, non-materialist factors play an important role in
facilitating cooperation? A liberal, benign hegemony, some have argued, may reduce the
competitive fears sparked by anarchy and promote adherence, credible verification and
enforcement. Randall L. Schweller & David Priess, supra note 19, at 16-18. Several scholars
have suggested that a “black box” approach to the state ignores important characteristics about
the state’s character; these characteristics are important variables in explaining the nature of
international order, adherence to this order, and durability of that order. See, e.g., G. John
Ikenberry, Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order, 23
INT’L SEC. 43 passim (1999).
31. E.H. CARR, supra note 15, at 82-83. The realist Robert Gilpin similarly maintains that
the hegemony is responsible for creating the international order, including the system of trade,
rights, and political relations. See ROBERT GILPIN, WAR & CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 135
(1981).
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the Great Depression resulted in part because of a global power
vacuum, he concluded that the maintenance of markets, stable
exchange rates, and policy coordination created the need for one
powerful country to assume responsibility.32
In international legal literature, several scholars have written
about the existence of hegemonic international law.33 This approach
seems consistent with hegemonic stability theory, but is more willing
to suggest that a hegemon may choose not to participate in certain
treaty regimes. In explaining this approach, Detlev Vagts has noted
that hegemonic states
[W]ould avoid agreements creating international regimes or
organizations that might enable lesser powers to form coalitions
that might frustrate the hegemon. . . . [but] a hegemon can use an
international organization to magnify its authority by a judicious
combination of voting power and leadership, as the United States
34
has often done.

Vagts also suggests that a “dominant power can minimize the
problem [of being held to troublesome treaties] by refusing to enter
into treaties it finds inconvenient; one need not call the roll of these
agreements, starting with the Law of the Sea Convention and the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and running to the
convention on land mines.”35
In sum, hegemonic stability theory predicts that a hegemon
would be likely to adhere to an international agreement if the
agreement appears to magnify the power of the hegemon.
Conversely, a hegemon would be less likely to adhere to an
international agreement if the agreement seems to restrict the
freedom of behavior of the hegemon.
36
4. Neoliberal Institutionalism. Neoliberal institutionalists also
assume that the international system is anarchic but believe that there
are significant reasons for participation in international legal regimes.
Regimes, they argue, help create transparency in the motives and

32. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION, 1929-1939 passim (1973).
33. Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843, 843 (2001).
34. Id. at 846.
35. Id.
36. Some of the literature refers to these scholars as “rationalist institutionalists.” See, e.g.,
Robert Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 379, 381 (1988).
The rationalist approach to cooperation suggests that states behave in a way that maximizes
their utility functions. It seeks to explain the conditions under which states will cooperate
through institutionalized arrangements. See id. at 381.
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decision making of the other parties, alleviating the uncertainty
inherent in anarchy. They also reduce transaction costs associated
with ad hoc exchanges in the international system, monitor and
contribute to enforcement, and impose sanctions for violation, all of
which modify the payoff structure in favor of cooperation. Moreover,
institutions lengthen the so-called “shadow of the future,” the
likelihood and importance of future interaction.37 Expecting future
iterations of the exchange may mean that one party is less likely to be
“tempted by immediate gains brought by unilateral defection,” thus
increasing the likelihood of cooperation.38
Neoliberals would not suggest that actors enter into a regime that
do not advance their interests. But they recognize that states would
benefit from such regimes. Indeed, neoliberals would not expect
regimes to arise unless those regimes allowed “states to do things they
otherwise could not do, that is, achieve mutual gains from
cooperation.”39 In this Lockean40 context, states are not motivated by
altruism, but by gain. Neoliberals, unlike realists, are not concerned
with relative gain, however. The prospect for absolute gain is a

37. Robert Axelrod discusses the emergence of cooperation as dependent on what he
refers to as the “shadow of the future.” See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 3-27 (1984). The shadow of the future can also be conceived as follows: “If a
state knows that it will interact with another state only once, the shadow of the future is
nonexistent and the state can pursue its short-term goals without considering the need to
interact with the other state on subsequent occasions. Institutional arrangements, however,
facilitate repeated interactions among states and thus lengthen the shadow of the future. If a
state knows that it will engage in many transactions over time through such an institutional
arrangement, it will be concerned about its long-term relationships with other states and will
thus have a motive to cooperate.” Arend, supra note 4, at 121.
38. Kenneth Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, 38
WORLD POL. 1 (1985).
39. Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin rebut Mearsheimer’s claim about the ineffectiveness
of institutions, arguing that institutions may harness overlapping state interests and facilitate
cooperation. Robert Keohane & Lisa Martin, The Promise of International Institutions, 20
INT’L SEC. 39, 39-41 (1995). Specifically, Keohane and Martin take issue with Mearsheimer’s
assertion, see supra note 20, at 7, that “institutions have minimal independent effect on state
behavior.” See id.
40. A Lockean international system would be one in which states—while still seeking to
promote their own interests—would not exist in a constant state of fear. Instead, they would be
able to pursue their interests through cooperative means. Alexander Wendt discusses the
potential movement of the international system “into a Lockean world of (mostly) mutually
recognized property rights and (mostly) egoistic rather than competitive conceptions of
security, reducing the fear that what states already have will be seized at any moment by
potential collaborators, thereby enabling them to contemplate more direct forms of
cooperation.” Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of
Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391, 415-16 (1992).
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sufficient motivation for a state to bind itself to international legal
regimes.
In defense of the assertion that states are more motivated by
absolute gains conferred by institutions rather than relative gains
pursued in the absence of institutions, some neoliberals cite states’
41
Unless institutions
financial investment in particular regimes.
impact state behavior, some scholars question why states would
42
“invest resources in expanding international institutions.”
Investment is but one indicator of states’ commitment to the
principles and benefits of institutionalized behavior. As later sections
will discuss, it is also one measure of state adherence.
In sum, neoliberals would predict that states will be more likely
to adhere to an international agreement if the agreement appears to
grant long-term benefits to the states by reducing transaction costs,
improving transparency, and allowing for the pooling of common
resources. It would also seem that states will be more willing to
adhere to an international agreement if they perceive that there will
be reciprocal benefits from membership in the regime.
5. Constructivism. Constructivism is one of the more recent
43
additions to the mainstream of international relations theory. A
44
self-styled sociological theory, constructivism makes two major
assumptions about the nature of the international system.
First, it asserts that the structure of the international system is a
“social structure.” As a social structure, the international system has
both material and non-material elements (which the realists and
neoliberals already claim). Constructivists would argue that material
conditions such as weapons, oceans, geography, and people are major
elements of the international system. What is different about the
41. Keohane & Martin, supra note 39, at 40.
42. Id.
43. There has been much recent scholarship on constructivism. See, e.g., Martha
Finnemore, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY passim (1996); Margaret Keck
& Kathryn Sikkink, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS passim (1998); NICHOLAS G. ONUF, WORLD OF OUR MAKING:
RULES AND RULE IN SOCIAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS passim (1989); JOHN
GERARD RUGGIE, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONALIZATION passim (1998); ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS passim (1999)
44. In some of the early literature, what has come to be called constructivism was referred
to as “reflective approach.” See, e.g., Keohane, supra note 36, at 379; Andrew Hurrell,
International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach, in REGIME THEORY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49 (V. Rittberger ed., 1993).
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constructivist approach is that constructivists claim that these material
elements have no inherent meaning apart from the interactions of
international actors. These elements are given meaning as states and
other actors interact and establish relationships with each other.
Alexander Wendt, for example, has explained that even the
significance of state possession of nuclear weapons is not set. In an
often-cited example, Wendt contends that “500 British nuclear
weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North
Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the
United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is
a function of shared understandings.”45 In other words, even hard,
material elements are meaningless in the absence of social
relationships. In addition to these material elements, constructivists
would argue that there are also non-material elements in the
international system. States and other international actors create a
variety of norms, including legal norms. Like the material elements,
these non-material elements also form a part of the structure of the
international system.
Second, constructivism claims that there is a “mutuallyconstitutive” relationship between actor and structure. On the one
hand,
the
actors
in
the
international
system—states,
intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations,
corporations, and a variety of other non-state actors—create or
constitute the structure of the international system. The actors,
through their interactions, create the non-material elements in the
international system and give meaning to the material elements. But
on the other hand, the structure also constitutes the actors. As the
actors interact with each other in a given international system, the
structural elements affect how the actors see themselves.46
An example of this mutually constitutive relationship can be seen
47
in the creation of the European Union. In the 1950s, a number of
European states created the various institutions of European
45. Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, 20 INT’L SEC. 71, 73 (1995).
46. How the structure creates the agent and how the agent acts as a force behind outcomes
in the international system is at the heart of the agent-structure discussion in constructivism.
Understanding the mutual constitution between agent and structure is integral to constructivism
but often underdeveloped. For more discussion on the agent-structure debate, see David
Dessler, What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate, 43 INT’L ORG. 441, 443 (1989).
47. For a discussion of the European Union and state identity, see Thomas Banchoff,
National Identity and EU Legitimacy in France and Germany, in LEGITIMACY AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION: THE CONTESTED POLITY 180 (Thomas Banchoff & Michael P. Smith ed.,
1999).
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integration—initially the European Coal and Steel Community and
the European Atomic Energy Community. In doing this, they were
creating a new structure for the European system. But as time
progressed, and the European states interacted with each other in the
context of this structure, the structure has affected the nature of the
actors and altered their identity. What it means to be an individual
state in Europe in 2005, for example, is very different than what it
meant to be one in 1956. The participation of those states over a
period of years has thus affected the very identity of the individual
states in Europe based on the evolution and interaction of ideas and
states across time.48
But while constructivism argues that the structure of the
international system can alter the identity of actors, the structure does
not inevitably have that effect. In other words, it is entirely possible
that states could create a particular structure—an international
organization, or legal regime for that matter—that would have no real
effect on the actors due to the nature of their interactions. A treaty,
for example, might be adopted by states but may not ultimately alter
the identity of those states. One of the problems with constructivism
is that it has yet to develop a clear theory to determine the
circumstances under which identity change will take place.
What predictions would constructivism make about adherence to
international regimes?
First, following the structural realists,
constructivists would assert that it is possible that the states may sign,
ratify, and even follow treaty provisions as a mere convenience.
When confronted with a national goal that seems to contradict the
treaty obligation, the state will feel no sense of obligation. In short,
the rule would be merely epiphenomenal—having no real effect on
the behavior of states. Second, just as the neoliberals claim, a
constructivist would recognize that states might adhere to an
international regime because of expectations and, in fact, the reality
of reciprocal gain. Third, and most important, constructivists would
argue that it is possible that adherence may be connected to
perceptions that the treaty regime defines the identity of the state.
This can happen either from the outset or as the state participates in
the treaty regime over time. On the one hand, it is possible that when
initially joining the treaty regime, the state will perceive the regime to

48. See Craig Parsons, Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union, 56
INT’L ORG. 47 passim (2002), for a discussion on the role of ideas and identities in the European
Union.
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be in accordance with its identity and will comply. Alternatively, it is
also possible that the state will sign and ratify the agreement without
any such perception, but will eventually come to see its identity
defined by the treaty regime. If this were to occur, the regime would
have had a significant effect in altering the identity of the state.
Unfortunately, as noted earlier, constructivists are not quite able to
predict when this change in identity will take place, but they argue
that this can happen and would point to historic examples where it
has happened.
II. METHODOLOGY
To explain state behavior relating to the participation of states in
international legal regimes, this Article examines how states have
acted with respect to several multilateral treaties. While there is an
extraordinarily wide range of both states and treaties to choose from,
we selected states and treaties that would offer significant insight into
state motivations.
A. State Selection
In choosing states, we selected states that would be generally
considered great powers either at the global or regional level. These
states were selected for two primary reasons. First, in order for treaty
regimes to be effective instruments, it is often necessary to have the
participation of the global and regional powers. Because these states
play major roles on the military, political, and/or economic planes, a
treaty is less likely to achieve its goals if these states are outside the
regime. Second, the states selected are thought to cover the different
positions identified in this study, offering a lens through which the
motivations and adherence of different regional or global positions
can be analyzed.
These states can be classified as falling into one of four
“positions” in the international system: hegemon, partner,
competitor, and adversary.49 The hegemon is an actor that can
exercise significant, if not dispositive, influence in either the global or
regional system. Robert Keohane defines a hegemon as a state that is
“powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate

49. This framework has been developed based on Alex Wendt’s “three cultures of
anarchy” construct that discusses Hobbes, Locke, and Kant (enemy, rival, and friend,
respectively). See ALEX WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 246-312
(1999).
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relations, and willing to do so.”50 In the treaty regimes explored in
this Article, the United States clearly is the hegemon, but, as will be
noted below, the European Union also seems to play that role in the
WTO. A partner is a state that generally has collaborative relations
with other states in a particular system—whether global or regional.
France and Germany, for example, are partners in the European
system. Their relationship is fundamentally collaborative, as they
share common goals and visions for international politics. Another
way to conceptualize this relationship is to conceive a partner as
existing in a Kantian51 relationship of amity with other states. A
competitor is a state that has rivalries with other states in particular
systems but is able to work out certain levels of cooperation. For
example, Argentina and Brazil are competitors of Latin America
because they compete for economic resources and in the area of
international trade. Despite the areas of disagreement, there is a
Lockean52 relationship that permits collaboration through
negotiations. An adversary is a state that is generally in a noncollaborative, enmity-like relationship with one or a number of other
states. Because of the Hobbesian53 nature of its relationships,
cooperation with other states is extraordinarily difficult. This was the
classic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. These positions can exist on either the global
or regional level.
Based on these classifications, the nineteen states under
examination can be depicted on the following chart—with the caveats
that states may fall into different positions in different contexts and
some non-state actors, such as the European Union, may also fall into
certain positions.

50. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 34-35 (1984).
51. IMMANUEL KANT, TO PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH, IN PERPETUAL
PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS (TED HUMPHREY trans., 1983). International relations scholars
have used Kant’s work as a basis for a particular understanding of international order. See, e.g.,
BULL, supra note 25, at 23-25. We use the concept of a Kantian system to indicate one in which
the states share common goals and common norms. In such a system, the basic mode of
behavior is highly cooperative.
52. See Wendt, supra note 45.
53. See supra note 27.
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Table 1.
State Selection: Regional and International Power Comparison
State

Region

Argentina

Latin America

Australia

Pacific

Brazil

Latin America
North
America

Canada

Regional or
Global Pairing
Competitor Brazil
United States,
Partner
Commonwealth
Countries
Competitor Argentina

Position

Partner

Atlantic Region

China

East Asia

Egypt
France
Germany
India
Iran
Israel
Japan
Nigeria
Pakistan

Middle East
Europe
Europe
South Asia
Middle East
Middle East
East Asia
Africa
South Asia

Russia

Eurasia

South Africa

Africa

Ukraine
United
Kingdom

Europe

Japan, Russia,
United States
Adversary Israel
Partner
Europe
Partner
Europe
Adversary Pakistan
Adversary Israel
Adversary Iran, Egypt
Partner
United States
Partner
Africa
Adversary India
United States,
Competitor
China
Sub Saharan
Partner
Africa
Partner
Europe, Russia

Europe

Partner

Atlantic Region

North
America

Hegemon

China, Russia,
Europe

United States

Competitor

B. Treaty Regime Selection
To examine state motivation for adherence to international
agreements, we selected a range of treaty regimes that would allow us
to test hypothesized reasons for participation. As a way of clarifying
any distinction between high and low politics international regimes,
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we selected two treaty regimes that exemplified the consummate issue
of high politics—security—and two that represent the realm of low
politics—trade and the environment. Looking at four regimes that
span the high-low politics continuum allows for a better
understanding of whether states are motivated differently by security
and trade issues. That is, whether states view participation differently
for different issue areas, and whether they are disproportionately
concerned with relative gains in one set of issues compared to
another.
The treaty regimes also vary in other ways that we suspect might
influence adherence behavior. First, the regimes vary in the nature of
their enforcement mechanisms. If, as we expect, states’ concerns
about violations by other states would be assuaged by a regime with
an ability to verify adherence more credibly, we might see a higher
propensity to participate in those regimes.
Second, the treaty regimes vary in the degree to which they may
be seen to infringe upon the sovereignty of state, or to put it another
way, compromise the autonomy of states.54 On the low end, the
treaties may modestly impose on autonomy, by affecting how a
domestic audience regards legitimate policy. A more intrusive regime
may introduce inspectors into a country suspected of violation and
may alter domestic institutional arrangements or policy. We select
treaties that vary in the degree to which they might interfere with
domestic sovereignty.
Treaties with greater potential for
intrusiveness might be associated with a state’s reluctance to ratify.
Third, the treaty regimes also vary with respect to their degree of
normativity. While the term normativity has been variously used in
international relations and international legal literature, we used the
term to indicate the degree to which states and other actors in the
international system perceive the obligations and institutions
established by a particular legal regime to be efficacious. Regime
normativity can be thought of along a continuum running from “low”
to “high.” Low normativity would exist when there is little consensus
among states and other relevant actors about the value of the regime.
High normativity, on the other hand, exists when there is a very broad
consensus in support of the value of the regime. In such a

54. Stephen Krasner defines autonomy such that “no external actor enjoys authority within
the borders of the state.” Stephen Krasner, Compromising Westphalia, 20 INT’L SEC. 115, 116
(1996). If the treaty requires modification of state policies, this results in an infringement of
state autonomy. See id.
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circumstance, there would be a general belief that the regime is
efficacious.
Various factors seem to contribute to the normativity of a legal
regime. Without providing an exhaustive list, some of these factors
are as follows: moral efficacy, fairness, and authoritativeness. Moral
efficacy would mean that states—and perhaps other international
actors—perceive the provisions and institutions embodied in the
regime to have a large degree of ethical “goodness.” The Slavery
55
Convention, for example, would likely be seen as having moral
efficacy because it embodies a prohibition against something that is
56
Fairness would
nearly universally seen as morally repugnant.
embody two basic principles: procedural fairness and just
57
distribution. If a treaty regime has both procedural fairness and is
seen as providing a just distribution it would be seen as fair.
Authoritativeness would refer to the degree to which the treaty
regime is perceived to see to possess legal authority, the degree to
which it is perceived to be the law.58 A treaty regime may have high
authoritativeness if the regime were codifying a pre-existing rule of
customary international law that had high authority. For example,
when the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations codified the
concept of diplomatic immunity in 1961, the treaty had high authority
because the pre-existing rule was well-established as highly
authoritative. A treaty regime could also enjoy high authority if it
were produced at a conference that enjoyed a wide level of support.
Certain provisions of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea,
such as the 12-nautical mile territorial sea, received such a level of
support that they would enjoy very high authority.
With these hypothesized explanatory variables in mind, we
selected the following four international regimes: The Comprehensive

55. Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 212 U.N.T.S. 17, amended by Protocol Amending
the Slavery Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 182 U.N.T.S. 51.
56. For a discussion of the evolution of the norm against slavery, see Patricia M.
Muhammad, The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Forgotten Crime Against Humanity as Defined
by International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 883 passim (2004).
57. FRANCK, supra note 4, at 7. Professor Franck explains that “procedural fairness” is the
perception of those addressed by a rule or a rule-making institution that the rule or institution
has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right
process. Id. When international actors perceive that the rule functions to produce a “just”
allocation of resources, it possesses the second element of fairness. Id. at 8.
58. A putative rule is perceived to be authoritative if the decision-making elites in states
perceive the rule to be law. In traditional legal parlance, a rule is authoritative if it has opinio
juris. This concept has been previously developed. See AREND, supra note 4, at 87.
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Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of
the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction (1997 Land Mine Treaty); the World
Trade Organization; and the Kyoto Protocol. As the table below
shows, the regimes were all developed around the same time period,
but vary in where they fall on the high/low politics distinction, their
potential to infringe on a state’s sovereignty, verification and
59
enforcement, and normativity.
International
Regime

Year Open
for
Ratification

High/
Low
Politics

Infringement
on
Sovereignty

Enforcement

Normativity

Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty
(CTBT)

1996

Very
High

High

Moderate

Medium

Land Mine
Treaty

1997

High

Moderate

Moderate

High

World Trade
Organization
(WTO)

1995

Low

Moderate

High

Uncertain

Kyoto
Protocol

1997

Low

Moderate

Low

Mixed

C. Evaluating Adherence
While it is easy to determine if a state is a party to an
international agreement, it is much more difficult to determine the
precise level of state adherence to a treaty regime. As a consequence,
we will examine a variety of factors to evaluate the level of
adherence. First, and foremost, we will explore the degree to which
the state in question carries out the legal obligations contained in the
treaty—bearing in mind that a state may carry out the obligations of a
treaty whether or not it is a formal party.60 In addition to looking at
59. See infra Part III for a discussion of these factors and the specific treaty regimes.
60. The most obvious and often-cited indication of adherence is whether a state is fulfilling
the provisions included in the treaty. For example, in the case of the Land Mine Treaty, has a
state party destroyed all stockpiles and all landmines under their jurisdiction, while also
terminating the production and exportation of landmines? Given that each treaty has a number
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the degree to which a state follows the explicit obligations of a treaty,
we will also examine a variety of other factors that indicate
adherence. One of these factors is institutional investment, or the
willingness of the state to expend funds or establish domestic
institutions for purposes of supporting the treaty regime. Another
factor is domestic embedding, which refers to the degree to which a
state has adopted legislation to implement provisions of the treaty
within that state’s domestic legal system. In the United States, for
example, congressionally enacted legislation that executes provisions
of a treaty that is not self-executing is the most obvious example.61
Yet another factor is the willingness of the state to accept any dispute
settlement mechanisms established by the treaty regime. This would
mean both the state’s willingness to participate in the proceedings of
any such mechanisms and its willingness to accept and abide by
decisions of such proceedings. Finally, we will also explore the
willingness of states to participate in conferences or other
negotiations connected to the treaty regime. In short, while there is
no scientific method for determining adherence with precision,
examining factors such as these and others that may be specific to a
particular treaty regime should provide substantial information on
which to make judgments about levels of adherence.
D. Determining State Motivations
Just as there is no precise method for determining adherence, so
too is there no perfect method for determining why a state adheres to
a particular international legal regime.62 Short of entering the minds
of the decision-making elites that act for the state, any method will
provide only a limited vision of state motives. Nonetheless, one of
the tasks of contemporary political science is to offer a window into
the motives of decision makers. One way to do this is to examine

of provisions, it is conceivable that states may adhere to several provisions, one provision, or
even part of one provision, but not the treaty in its entirety.
61. For example, it is common practice in the United States to enact legislation for treaties
that are not self-executing.
The United States passed the Genocide Convention
Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (2000), and the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 18 U.S.C. §§ 23402340B (2000), both of which were congressionally-enacted for the purpose of executing those
two particular non-self-executing treaties.
62. As noted at the outset of this article, Professor Michael Glennon has eloquently
commented on the problem of assessing causation in international relations and has expressed
profound skepticism about efforts to determine the motivations of policymakers. Glennon,
supra note 3, at 987-89 (arguing that it is impossible to know the motives of decision makers).
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what these decision makers say about their motivation for adhering to
international agreements. By looking at official documents, speeches,
and statements, an investigator can glean a basic understanding about
the justifications states give for their adherence behavior.63 While
64
undoubtedly these official statements are imperfect, they still
provide an important indicator of motivation.65 Accordingly, this
Article will explore a variety of statements made by decision making
elites in the public fora. We believe that these public proclamations
will provide significant insight into motives for adherence.
III. APPLICATION
A. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
1.

Background of the Treaty Regime.

a. Background. Supported strongly by the U.N. General
Assembly, negotiations to proscribe nuclear testing in all
environments began in 1993. Between 1993 and 1996, the treaty was
drafted and ultimately opened for signature on September 10, 1996.
At that time, 71 states, including the 5 nuclear weapon states, signed
the treaty in New York. At present, 176 have signed the treaty, 131

63. Professor Jeffry Frieden in his discussion of state preferences calls this method
“observation.” Jeffry A. Frieden, Actors and Preferences in International Relations, in
STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 39, 40 (David A. Lake & Robert Powell
eds., 1999).
64. Frieden points out the difficulty of this observational method for determining state
motivations:
All these ways to pin down the preferences imputed to nation-states for use in further
analysis share a major problem, common to the investigation of anything that cannot
be directly observed. The attempt to “induce” preferences by observation risks
confounding preferences with their effects.
The behavior observed—policies,
statements, responses to surveys—is used “inductively” as indicative of preferences.
Yet, in all these instances it may well be that this behavior results only partially,
perhaps misleadingly, from underlying preferences. Perhaps the environment within
which the behavior takes place is responsible for it in important ways that make it
impossible to “read back” from behavior to preferences. The problem is well
understood by survey researchers, who spend a great deal of time trying to make sure
that the observation (the answer) is as true a reflection as possible of the individual’s
beliefs (the opinion).
Id. at 59.
65. Even though Frieden points out the pitfalls of this approach, he acknowledges that
“[i]n many instances, [the observational approach] may be the best research strategy available.”
Id. at 60.
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of whom have ratified.66 Because the CTBT addresses nuclear
weapons and their effects on war and peace, it and other treaties
designed to control proliferation fall under the category of high
politics.67
68

b. Legal Obligations. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
requires that each state party not “carry out any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and . . . prohibit[s] and
prevent[s] any such nuclear explosion at any place under its
jurisdiction or control.”69 The Treaty’s provisions prevent testing
nuclear weapons in all environments. Although all nuclear states
have signed the CTBT, it has not yet entered into force because not
all of the forty-four states known to possess nuclear weapons or
reactors have ratified the treaty. To date, only thirty-three have done
so, including Russia, the United Kingdom, and France. Other key
nuclear states, including the United States, India, Pakistan, Israel, and
China have not ratified. 70 Nonetheless, several of the nuclear states—
the United States and China—have signed a moratorium on nuclear
tests, indicating their intent not to test nuclear weapons.71

66. For ratification data on the CTBT, see CTBTO Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, http://www.ctbto.org (last visited Mar.
8, 2006).
67. There is a rich literature on arms control. See MICHAEL A. LEVI & MICHAEL E.
O’HANLON, THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL (2005); CONTEMPORARY NUCLEAR DEBATES:
MISSILE DEFENSE, ARMS CONTROL, AND ARMS RACES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(Alexander T.J. Lennon, ed. 2002); Patricia Hewitson, Nonproliferation and Reduction of
Nuclear Weapons: Risks of Weakening the Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm, 21
Berkeley J. Int’l L. 405 (2003).
68. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, U.N. Doc. A/50/1027/Annex, 35 I.L.M. 1439
(1996) [hereinafter CTBT]. For further background on the CTBT, see ROBERT KIRK, A
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY: A NEW VERIFICATION ROLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY passim (1995).
69. CTBT, supra note 68, art. 1.
70. Id. art. XIV. Of these forty-four states, the following have signed and ratified: Algeria,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico,
the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation,
Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.
The following have signed, but not ratified: China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel,
United States of America, Vietnam. The following have neither signed nor ratified: Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, India, and Pakistan. See Status of Signature and Ratification,
http://www.ctbto.org (select “Signature and Ratification” hyperlink; then select “Status”
hyperlink; then select “Go” button) (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
71. Reference to China’s moratorium is included in the Chinese official statement at the
2003 Entry into Force Conference in Vienna. See H.E. Ambassador Zhang Yan, Head of the
Chinese Delegation, Statement at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
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c. Enforcement Mechanisms. The CTBT includes a verification
regime intended to monitor and detect any nuclear test around the
globe. The International Monitoring System (IMS) includes 321
monitoring stations and sixteen laboratories intended to collect
72
evidence of nuclear tests. The system monitors global activity, which
is then processed and recorded by CTBT Organization (CTBTO)
analysts. IMS data is sent to state signatories, who can respond by
requesting clarification of possible non-adherence. State parties that
receive requests must provide clarification within forty-eight hours. If
information provided for clarification is not satisfactory to the state
that requested information, an on-site inspection (OSI) may be
requested. The intent of the inspection would be to ascertain any
violation of the Treaty, “gather any facts which might assist in
identifying any possible violator,”73 and to provide a final verification
measure. Only after the Treaty enters into force, however, would
OSIs be conducted. Thus, no inspections have occurred to date. In
sum, the verification/enforcement arrangements of the CTBT would
seem to be “low.”
d. Effect on Sovereignty.
By itself, the International
Monitoring System (IMS) is not intrusive. Its monitoring of global
events is more surveillance of all global activity rather than of
specifically targeted states. What may be perceived by some states to
be intrusive are the next verification and enforcement steps.
Although the CTBTO asserts that the inspection “would be
conducted in the least intrusive manner to protect the national
security interests of the Inspected State Party” and that “the
disclosure of confidential information unrelated to the purpose of the
inspection would be prevented,” the net effect is that the suspected
state must admit inspectors into its country.74 Accordingly, the CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Apr. 9, 2003), http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/
hy2003/t85267.htm [hereinafter Statement by H.E. Ambassador Zhang Yan]. See THE NAT’L
ACADEMIES (July 31, 2002), Academy Addresses Technical Issues in Nuclear Test Ban Treaty:
Verification Capabilities Are Good, Cheating Possibilities Are Limited, and Safety and Reliability
of U.S. Weapons Can Be Maintained Without Nuclear Tests, http://www4.nationalacademies.org/
news.nsf/isbn/0309085063?OpenDocument for historical reference to the American
moratorium.
72. The verification regime is established by art. IV of the CTBT and elaborated upon in
the Protocol to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. CTBT, supra note 68, art. IV; see also id.,
Protocol.
73. Id. art. IV, sec. D, para. 35.
74. CTBTO, OVERVIEW OF THE VERIFICATION REGIME, http://www.ctbto.org/
verification/onsiteinspection.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
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regime infringement on sovereignty would be rated at the “high”
level.
e. Normativity. In light of what some commentators have
75
called the “nuclear taboo,” it might seem at the outset that the
normativity of the CTBT would be very high. But there is still a
strong sense by states such as the United States and China that
certain testing of weapons is necessary to maintain the reliability of
the nuclear stockpiles.76 Moreover, states like India and Pakistan
seem to believe that a regime that prohibits testing for all states
operates in an unfair manner for those states that do not have a welldeveloped nuclear stockpile.77 Because of these varying beliefs about
the regime, it will be rated at a “moderate” level.
2. Adherence Behavior. Given this analysis, states seem to fall
into three categories: high, medium, and low adherence. Eight states
fall into the high range: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France,
Germany, Japan, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Four states fall
into the medium category: Nigeria, Russia, and South Africa. And
seven states fall into the low area: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel,
Pakistan, and the United States.
Of the states that have technically fulfilled the provisions of the
treaty—all states except Pakistan and India—adherence behavior has
been variable. What may explain the variance are states’ historical
ambitions regarding nuclear weapons. Some states, such as Canada,
have never seriously considered a nuclear program and required little
deliberation before ratifying and fulfilling the provisions of the treaty
regime. These states tend to adhere more closely to the regime in part
because doing so requires no deviation of their current policy.
Other CTBT states such as Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa,
had at one time considered nuclear programs but had already agreed
to restrict their nuclear development with the ratification of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since testing a nuclear device is a
key component of nuclear development, fulfillment of the CTBT
provisions is almost a de facto prerequisite for NPT ratification by
non-nuclear states. Nonetheless, these states not only have fulfilled
the provisions but have been consistent participants in the regime and

75. See, e.g., NINA TANNENWALD ET AL., THE NUCLEAR TABOO: THE UNITED STATES
(2005).
76. See infra notes 80-82, 91-93 and accompanying text.
77. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.

AND THE NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE 1945 passim
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advocates of the universalization of the treaty. South Africa has gone
even further and hosted workshop and training programs on the
CTBT for African states, acting almost as a CTBT ambassador to its
region.78
Since the NPT allows nuclear states to retain their inventories,
the nuclear states represent more difficult cases when looking at the
effect of the treaty on state behavior. Of the internationally
recognized nuclear states, three have ratified the treaty, but none of
the states, even those that have not ratified (China and the United
States), have confirmed tests. France, which was actively testing
during the CTBT negotiations of 1995, advocated the zero option
prohibiting any level or circumstance of testing. After completing
final testing in January 1996, France dismantled its Pacific test site
and was one of the first states—along with the U.K., another nuclear
state—to ratify the CTBT in April 1998.
China, Russia, and the United States each present different
permutations on the ratification and adherence combination. China
was one of the first states to sign the treaty in September 1996 but has
not yet ratified; nonetheless, it issued a moratorium on testing in July
1996 and reasserted its commitment to that moratorium in 1999. It
also has plans to establish twelve International Monitoring Stations
(IMS) on its territory, has been an active participant in the
Conferences, and has established a National Preparatory Authority
for Implementation of CTBT that is in charge of Treaty
implementation in China. China has urged other nuclear states to
continue observing their moratoria on testing and a timely
universalization of the treaty, particularly by those countries whose
erroneous position on the treaty have prevented ratification.79
China, however, continues to have unresolved reservations about
the Treaty. First, China retains its early concern about the zero yield
circumstance, which would prohibit “peaceful nuclear explosions”

78. “South Africa concluded ‘facility agreements’ with the CBTO permitting it to establish,
in terms of the Treaty, International Monitoring System (IMS) stations within South Africa at
Boshof, Marion Island, Sutherland and at the SANAE base in Antarctica.” Department of
Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, available
at http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/ctbt.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
79. See H.E. Ambassador Shen Guofang, Head of the Chinese Delegation, Statement at
the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (Nov. 12, 2001), http://www.un.org/webcast/ctbt/statements/chinaE.htm [hereinafter
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Shen Guofang].
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(PNEs).80 While China has dropped its earlier insistence, it has
asserted the need to address PNEs ten years after entry into force;
China appears to believe that PNEs may be necessary for the
maintenance and modernization of its inventory, which suggests that
even if China were to ratify, its future adherence is uncertain.
Second, China objects to using National Technical Means (NTM)—
overhead reconnaissance satellites—for verification of adherence
behavior. They argue that using NTM gives a monitoring advantage
to Russia and the United States, who have a comparative advantage
in reconnaissance technology. Moreover, they have continued to
oppose allowing NTM as part of the verification regime, specifically
with the triggering of on-site inspections (OSI), which are considered
intrusive and an infringement on sovereignty.81 In spite of these
reservations, China publicly endorses the treaty and indicates that it
“attaches importance to the treaty and has been working unswervingly for its
82

early entry into force.”

Russia was an early signatory of the CTBT and ratified the
treaty, but its adherence has been more circumspect. The Russian
nuclear test site, Novaya Zemlya, has sparked suspicion for several
reasons. First, the Russian government has asserted the importance
of maintaining the test site as a matter of national security and pride
as a nuclear state. Second, the northern facility lacks transparency,
and open source details of nuclear testing are controvertible, making
CTBT violations difficult to discern. The Russian government has
acknowledged that they maintain and even upgrade the site, that they
have conducted subcritical tests—allowed under the Treaty—and that
they may need to resume testing in the future depending on political

80. In earlier negotiations, China argued that PNEs were necessary for the development of
peaceful nuclear energy. China used its status as a “developing country” to argue that it would
suffer a disadvantage were it not allowed to explore advanced nuclear technology. The CTBT,
China argued, would limit scientific and technological development. See The Chinese
Delegation, Statement on the “Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Peaceful Nuclear
Explosion” Before the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, Working Group II, (Mar. 9, 1995), available at
http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/ctbt0395.htm.
81. One of China’s consistent reservations regarding the CTBT has been the use of NTM
for inspections. See NTI AND CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, COMPREHENSIVE
TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT), http://www.nti.org/db/china/ctbtorg.htm; see also NTI AND
CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, CHINA’S ATTITUDE TOWARD NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM) OF VERIFICATION, http://www.nti.org/db/china/ntmpos.htm (last
visited Feb. 6, 2006). See also Sha Zukang, Chinese Ambassador to the Conference on
Disarmament (Aug. 1, 1996), http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/sha0896.htm.
82. See Statement by H.E. Ambassador Zhang Yan, supra note 71.
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developments.83
The rhetoric, subcritical tests, and active
maintenance of the facility call into question Russia’s commitment to
the moratorium. If Russia determined the need to resume nuclear
tests, it would be required to test subcritically, test clandestinely, or
withdraw from the treaty. For now, however, Russia maintains that it
is committed to the treaty and its moratorium and that the U.S. media
and government has charged Russia with violations of the CTBT only
to distract international attention away from its own failure to ratify
the treaty.84
Although the United States contributes financially to the
85
President
CTBTO, its overall adherence appears to be waning.
Clinton signed the treaty in 1996 and submitted it for advice and
86
consent by the Senate in 1997. On October 13, 1999, the Senate
failed to approve the treaty by a vote of 51-48.87 President Bush,
though he has applauded states such as Libya for committing to the
CTBT, has been loath to bind the United States to the treaty, arguing
instead the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is necessary for
dealing with new threats and requires testing as part of the
development.88
Thus far, the United States has gone about

83. See NTI AND CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, RUSSIA: ARCHIVED CTBT
RATIFICATION AND NUCLEAR TESTING DEVELOPMENTS; NOVAYA ZEMLYA TEST SITE TO BE
MAINTAINED; RUSSIA COMPLETES PLANNED SERIES OF SUBCRITICAL NUCLEAR TESTS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH CTBT STANDARDS; http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/treaties/
ctbt2.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
84. Comparisons of the Russian and American nuclear programs have been documented
by numerous analysts, including those at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies, which has compiled evidence and analysis from
open-source materials regarding the Russian and U.S. nuclear development programs. See, e.g.,
CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, RENEWED U.S.- RUSSIAN CONTROVERSY OVER
NUCLEAR TESTING (May 27, 2002), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020527.htm.
85. The United States has typically been a substantial contributor to the treaty regime but
in recent years has decreased its contribution. It continues to support monitoring activities
through the International Monitoring System but has limited its financial support to the regime,
earmarking funding only for the monitoring system. See, e.g., Daryl Kimball, Arms Control
Association, Maintaining U.S. Support for the CTBT Verification System, (2002),
http://www.armscontrol.org/aca/ctbtver.asp.
86. Marion Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law 92, AM. J. INT’L L. 44, 59 (1998).
87. See http://foreign.senate.gov/treaties.pdf, for the legislative history of the CTBT in the
U.S. Senate.
88. See, e.g., George Perkovich, Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in
Nonproliferation, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2003), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030301
facomment10334/george-perkovich/bush-s-nuclear-revolution-a-regime-change-innonproliferation.html. The Bush administration has asserted the goal of maintaining primacy,
which it argues may require modernization of its existing capabilities. See id.
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maintaining and modernizing its nuclear inventory by conducting subcritical tests, which are periodically conducted by the National
89
Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA).
United States government policy statements, however, have
hinted at the need for more robust testing in the future. The 2002
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states the need for a responsive
infrastructure, one that is capable of maintaining confidence in the
existing inventory and developing new capabilities for the purpose of
90
addressing future security threats. The briefing associated with the
NPR indicated that significant investment and modification to the
existing force would be required to meet the requirements for a
responsive infrastructure.91 Also associated with the NPR has been
an increase in funds to study the modernization of the nuclear force
and specific warheads; while the study is within the provisions of the
CTBT, any development of new weapons would violate the
provisions.92
Although the United States has maintained a
moratorium on testing, it holds open the possibility that new weapons
may be required and tested.93
Ratification and adherence for the unofficial nuclear states have
been decidedly low. In addition to India and Pakistan, which did not
ratify but did conduct tests,94 several Middle Eastern states appear to
89. See, e.g., Congressional Research Service report, Jonathan Medalia, Nuclear Testing
and Comprehensive Test Ban: Chronology Starting September 1992, Order Code 97-1007 F (June
9, 2005).
90. See Perkovich, supra note 88.
91. Leaks from Nuclear Posture Review indicates that “new capabilities must be developed
to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply buried targets to find and attack mobile and
relocatable targets, to defeat chemical or biological agents, and to improve accuracy and limit
collateral damage.” For reports on the leaked report, see David Ruppe, U.S. Seeks Range of
New Nuclear Capabilities, Leaked Document Indicates, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, Mar.
14, 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020314-nuke01.htm. For the official
briefing on the report, see, e.g., Defense Department News Transcript, Special Briefing on the
Nuclear Posture Review, (Jan. 9, 2002), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t01092002_
t0109npr.html; Congressional Research Service, Amy F. Woolf, The Nuclear Posture Review:
Overview and Emerging Issues, Order Code RS21133 (Jan. 31, 2002).
92. Though Congressional support has been limited, the Congress did fund Department of
Energy and Defense research for “bunker buster” weapons. For a thorough discussion of the
NPR and follow-on policies, see PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE, TRACKING NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/proliferation/countries/us.html.
93. The Pentagon, in its press release for the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) indicated its
continuing opposition to the CTBT but also its continuing support for the moratorium on
testing.
Transcript of Press Release available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Pentagon Press Release].
94. The Acronym Institute, which monitors nonproliferation, cites that three states—India,
Pakistan, and North Korea—have not signed the CTBT. See The Acronym Institute, Pakistan
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be concerned not just with their own ability to develop nuclear
weapons but with the inability to verify effectively whether regional
competitors are testing weapons that could be used offensively.
Adherence is low for the Middle East countries under consideration,
as the Egyptian representative to the Conference on Facilitating the
Entry in to Force of the CTBT noted that the “question of the
ratification of the CTBT cannot neglect regional considerations
associated with the Middle East[,] [e]specially, Israel’s position vis-àvis the ratification of the treaty, and her stances on nuclear nonproliferation in general.”95 Israel signed the treaty in 1996, but claims
96
not to have ratified because of concerns with verification. To this
end, it has offered to participate in the development of the
verification regime, as well as commit resources to the monitoring
technology for the region.97 While agreeing to build monitoring
stations in Israel is more likely an indicator of Israel’s interest in
promoting its own security rather than a sign of commitment to the
treaty regime itself, Israel has vigorously asserted its general support
for credible verification as a sine qua non for its entry into the
regime.98
In reading statements from states as to what concerns cause them
not to ratify or adhere to the CTBT, a clear pattern emerges. When it
comes to nuclear weapons, many states recognize that their own
security is directly a function of the activities of other states. In this
regard, security gains for one side are considered to be a loss for the
other side, creating a security dilemma between or among the
competitor states. Fear that an adversary would not adhere to the
treaty results in non-adherence in other competitor states. The ways

Responds to India’s Nuclear Doctrine, 41 DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY (Nov. 1999),
http://www.acronym.org.uk/41pakis.htm.
95. H.E. Ambassador Mahmoud Mubarak, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Arab Republic of Egypt, Statement at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force Of
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Nov. 11-13, 2001), http://www.un.org/webcast/
ctbt/statements/egyptE.htm [hereinafter Statement by H.E. Ambassador Mahmoud Mubarak].
Egypt’s statement at the Entry into Force Conference reflects that of other Middle East
countries, including Iran, which are concerned with Israel’s nuclear development and its
potential to target other countries in the region. See id.
96. Pentagon Press Release, supra note 93.
97. Id.
98. Israel’s position on the CTBT is captured in the national statement by Gideon Frank.
See Gideon Frank, Director General of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, Statement at the
Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(Nov. 11, 2001), http://www.un.org/webcast/ctbt/statements/israelE.htm [hereinafter Statement
by Gideon Frank].
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in which those fears animate states are manifested as different
patterns of behavior.
While China, for example, appears to be concerned about its
position of disadvantage if it ratifies, the United States has not. In
spite of the oblique language, China is clearly concerned with the
United States’ decision not to ratify: “It is notable that regrettable
voices have been uttered in the process of endeavoring for an early
entry into force of the CTBT. The 1st Conference on Facilitating the
Entry into Force of the CTBT had barely concluded, a country
explicitly refused to ratify the treaty. More recently, it even asserted
that it would participate in the work of the PrepCom for CTBTO
99
selectively.” China, as previously noted, is also concerned with the
United States’ and Russia’s relative advantage in monitoring and
verifying nuclear activity. Not only has the United States not ratified
the treaty, it (as well as Russia) also has superior technology for doing
reconnaissance on test activities.100 China is, therefore, not only
concerned with the constraints that CTBT ratification would place on
it primarily vis-à-vis the United States, but also concerned with its
relative deficiency in the ability to monitor test activity. Its position
as a rising power and a potential challenger to the United States in
the capacity of global hegemon means that it monitors the U.S.
behavior and adheres on a level of rough parity with the hegemon.
Concerns with relative security influence, not just the behavior of
challenging powers, but also the behavior of regional powers. A close
look at the empirical record on ratifications suggests that regional
powers ratify, or fail to ratify, in blocs. The three European regional
partners—Germany, France, and the U.K.—signed and ratified in the
101
Specifically, the two nuclear powers coordinated on
same period.
submitting their instruments of ratification on the same day, among
102
the first thirteen states to ratify the treaty.
Brazil and Argentina offer another example in which regional
powers—this time regional competitors—have worked in tandem to
commit themselves to non-proliferation. Both states engaged in
nuclear research in the 1970s, but began negotiating joint nonproliferation agreements that culminated with a bilateral agreement
signed in 1991, the signing of the regional non-proliferation

99.
100.
101.
102.

Statement by H. E. Ambassador Shen Guofang, supra note 79.
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Mahmoud Mubarak, supra note 95.
See supra note 70, at the CTBTO hyperlink for the status of signature and ratification.
Statement by Gideon Frank, supra note 98.
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agreement in 1993-94, and the ratification of the Nuclear Non103
Although Argentina has
Proliferation Treaty several years later.
been the first to ratify each of these previous agreements, Brazil took
the lead in signing the CTBT, with Argentina ratifying within months
thereafter. For the CTBT and the previous non-proliferation
agreements, the regional cooperation must be understood in terms of
rapprochement between the two powers. Each country had gradually
dismissed long-held nuclear development policies through the process
of bilateral negotiations involving transparency and confidencebuilding measures.104 The result has been a de-escalation of previous
competitive tensions and a joint willingness to conclude their nuclear
ambitions.
The Brazil-Argentina example reflects a neoliberal institutional
motivation. Although the history between the two states has been
tense at times, given their previous nuclear ambitions, both states
have concluded that maximizing their own security and economic
position depends on strong bilateral relations, which are made more
efficient with the transparency afforded by the non-proliferation
institutions. The gradual commitment to these institutions has been a
process of reciprocity, in which both sides have acknowledged the
opportunity for mutual gain, sat down at the negotiating table, and
offered their cooperation. In the initial phases, Argentina made the
overtures by ratifying first, but specifically with the CTBT, Brazil
ratified before Argentina, cementing the tit-for-tat process of
reciprocity between the two states, consistent with neoliberal
institutionalist expectations of cooperation.
Conversely, the motivations by the non-ratifying states in the
Middle East—regional adversaries—are consistent with realist
concerns with anarchy and relative gains. States appear to react to
the perceived threat of Israel, which is thought to have a welldeveloped nuclear program but has not ratified either the NPT or the

103. John R. Redick, et. al., Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the
Nonproliferation Regime, 18 WASH. Q. 107, 110-12 (1995). The agreement of the early 1990s
was a pact between Argentina and Brazil and signed by the IAEA and Agência BrasileiroArgentina de Contabilidade e Contrôle de Materiais Nucleares (ABACC), an agency designed
to account for and control nuclear development in South America. This bilateral agreement
allowed for full-scale IAEA safeguards of the nuclear installations in each country. After being
signed in 1991, it was finally ratified by Brazil in 1994. Brazil and Argentina both signed the
Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994, creating a regional nuclear free zone of Latin America. See
BRAZILIAN-ARGENTINE AGENCY FOR ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR
MATERIALS (ABACC), http://www.abacc.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
104. Redick et al., supra note 103, at 110-12.
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CTBT.105 The Middle East regional powers that have not ratified the
CTBT consistently cite Israel as their main reason for not ratifying.
Iran, echoing the concerns of Egypt, asserted that the “the Middle
East is threatened by the Israeli nuclear program . . . . This policy of
terror has . . . created a situation where many disarmament and arms
control instruments have failed to receive the full support of regional
countries.”106 These states are unwilling to constrain their own
development as long as the regional nuclear threat is unconstrained.
Any tests that Israel conducts are thought to compromise the security
of the surrounding states; such rationale is clearly a zero sum, realist
calculation.
Israel operates out of a similar set of concerns, but their specific
concern appears to be with credible verification of other state parties
to the treaty. The Israeli government asserts its long-standing
support for non-proliferation, but claims that it is not confident in the
107
Rather, it
ability of the verification regime to detect violators.
questions the regime’s “immunity to abuse” and argues that verifiable
adherence by other states in the Middle East is required for Israel to
participate more fully in the regime.108 In short, all states in the
Middle East perceive their security to be at particular risk when a
rival state chooses not to adhere to the security regime and when
compliance cannot be adequately verified. Given these calculations,
the Middle Eastern states under consideration have chosen not to
ratify.
Concerns with infringement on sovereignty have motivated
several states, including China.
One of China’s concerns in
negotiations has been the use of on-site negotiations as a vehicle for
treaty verification. 109 The government was concerned that using
human intelligence as a warrant for inspections would legitimize
espionage, and that requests for inspections might be vulnerable to

105. See id.
106. H.E. Dr. M. Javad Zarif, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Statement at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New York (Nov. 11-13, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/
webcast/ctbt/statements/iranE.htm; see also Nuclear-Weapon Use by Terrorists, ‘Chain Of
Setbacks’ in Disarmament Among Issues Highlighted in Test-Ban-Treaty Conference, text from
the Second Meeting of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT,
available at http://www.ctbto.org/reference/article_xiv/2001/un_pressrelease_111101_pm.pdf
[hereinafter Statement by H.E. Dr. M. Javad Zarif] (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
107. See Statement by Gideon Frank, supra note 98.
108. See id.
109. Statement by H.E. Dr. M. Javad Zarif, supra note 106.
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abuses by other state parties.110 In signing the treaty, China asserted
the importance of its sovereignty:
[The Chinese Government] firmly opposes the abuse of verification
rights by any country, including the use of espionage or human
intelligence, to infringe upon the sovereignty of China and impair
its legitimate security interests in violation of universally recognized
111
principles of international law.

In part as a result of China’s concerns regarding inspections as well as
the sovereignty concerns of the United States, the treaty requires that
thirty of the Executive Council’s fifty-one members approve any
112
Maintaining sovereignty and eschewing the
inspection.
transparency generally associated with institutions is a consistent
interest of China with regard to this treaty.
Although the United States was the first to sign the CTBT
(China was second), the early signature was not an early indicator of
its commitment to the treaty. The United States has applauded states
that ratified the treaty, as it did with Libya when it ratified in January
2004,113 but has, nevertheless, slipped away from ratifying the treaty.
International reaction to the Senate’s vote against the treaty in 1999
does not appear to have changed the American position towards
ratification,114 and in fact, the United States has become even less
110. Id.
111. Statement by the Chinese Government upon Signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) (Sept. 24, 1996), http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/ctbtdec.htm.
112. The so-called “green light” procedure authorizes inspections after thirty of the fifty-one
Council members approve a state party’s request for inspection. The Executive Council consists
of Annex I countries with representation from Africa (ten), Eastern Europe (seven), Latin
America and the Caribbean (nine), Middle East and South Asia (seven), North America and
Western Europe (ten), and the Pacific (eight). See art. II, the Organization, sec. C of the CTBT.
Discussion of the green light procedure may be found at the Nuclear Threat Initiative,
http://www.nti.org/db/china/ctbtorg.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
113. In a joint declaration with the European Union, the United States cited the Libyan
accession to the CTBT, its cooperation with the IAEA, and its accession to the Chemical
Weapons Convention as examples of successful efforts to control proliferation. See Press
Release, the White House, Text Of U.S.-EU Declaration On The Non-Proliferation Of
Weapons Of Mass Destruction (June 26, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2004/06/20040626-6.html.
114. Several countries asserted their disappointment with the U.S. vote, including Japan,
China, Canada, Australia, and Ukraine. See, e.g., Country Statements at the Conference on
Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and various Embassy
statements, including Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Remarks By Secretary Of State,
Madeleine K. Albright and Ichita Yamamoto, Japanese State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
(Oct. 18, 1999), http://canberra.usembassy.gov/hyper/WF991018/epf103.htm . Though U.S.
diplomats, particularly under the Clinton administration, continued to express their support for
expeditious ratification, the United States has not again submitted the treaty for ratification to
the Senate.
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supportive of the regime. Several factors impede American support
for the treaty.
The first relates to security optimization and the role of nuclear
weapons in managing U.S. security interests. The United States has
argued that the best way to maintain confidence in its inventory is to
conduct periodic nuclear tests, without which the United States would
115
A
not be able to uncover design, safety, or reliability problems.
treaty that potentially constrains its ability to maintain its arsenal and
defend itself properly is unlikely to gain U.S. support. Some experts
have argued that the United States can ensure the continuing
performance of weapons in its stockpile by testing the non-nuclear
components of the weapons—an activity allowed under the CTBT—
and that the United States has not traditionally relied on such tests
for maintenance.116 This assessment is potentially useful for assuaging
concerns about current stockpiles and is consistent with why the
United States has been able to maintain its moratorium on testing. It
does not address, however, the possibility that the United States
would need to develop new types of weapons, which do require
testing.
The second concern of the United States is with regard to
verification, in particular, that states could conduct tests below the
threshold of detection. The implication is that these states would be
able to enhance their nuclear advantage while remaining a ratifying
party of the regime. Without a credible guarantee that other nuclear
states and states with nuclear ambition will adhere to the provisions
of the treaty, those who do adhere would be at a relative
disadvantage.
Some proliferation specialists have noted that
meaningful tests below the level of detection are not plausible, and
that only a handful of highly experienced nuclear-weapon states could
succeed in conducting clandestine tests, and those tests would yield
117
Nonetheless, detection and verification require a
limited insight.
full implementation of the International Monitoring System, which

115. See supra note 113.
116. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY 20 (2002).
117. The National Academy of Sciences noted that the United States, Russia, France,
China, and the U.K. might be able to succeed in conducting clandestine tests under the
threshold of detection. The Committee also noted that such tests would not offer substantial
insight compared to what these states already know. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
supra note 116, at 61-78.
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requires the participation of other states including those that have not
ratified the treaty like China and Israel.
Adherence behavior on the part of the United States appears to
be motivated by realist concerns of cooperation and defection under
anarchy. Without credible assertion that other rival countries will
comply and that non-adherence will be detected and punished, the
United States is averse to submitting to adherence. As one opponent
of the CTBT has noted, “U.S. ratification would most likely have
ended up placing dangerous restrictions on the reliability of the
American nuclear arsenal without similarly restricting the capabilities
118
Concerns with the
of other nuclear powers, present and future.”
relative advantages of states that defect, and the relative advantage of
the United States if it enhances its arsenal, have both prohibited the
United States from ratifying the CTBT.
3. Validation of Theories. In summary, states appear to be
motivated by concern for relative security. In the absence of a
perfectly credible verification regime—a reality in an anarchic
world—states are reluctant to constrain their ability to maintain a
stable, reliable arsenal. The effects of anarchy are particularly acute
for states that are regional adversaries: India and Pakistan, and Israel,
Egypt, and Iran. What Brazil and Argentina—two states that can be
considered regional competitors—show, however, is that just as
tensions can escalate, making cooperation in the security arena
prohibitively difficult, they can also de-escalate, creating conditions
for cooperation. Over a period of a couple decades, these two
countries engaged in a series of bilateral confidence-building
agreements that set the stage for the multilateral regime of the NPT
and CTBT. Previous bilateral détente may not be the necessary and
sufficient condition for broader cooperation in a multilateral treaty,
but it seems to have worked in the case of Brazil and Argentina. The
European countries are arguably protected by the U.S. security
umbrella, but did in fact sign and ratify in concert, suggesting some
awareness of the behavior of other regional players. It appears that
the other countries are still too concerned with regional security and
their ability to maximize their security, particularly vis-à-vis
competitors in the region. This conclusion would seem to validate
both the realist and neoliberal hypotheses. While the general

118. Robert Kagan & William Kristol, Senate Republicans’ Finest Hour, WEEKLY
STANDARD, Oct. 25, 1999, at 11.
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behavior of states would seem to support a realist interpretation, the
fact that particular states—such as Brazil and Argentina—are able to
take advantage of the regime would support a neoliberal
understanding of the reciprocal benefits to be gained by participation
in the treaty.
B. The Land Mine Convention
1.

Overview of the Treaty Regime.

a. Background. On September 18, 1997, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti119
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction was signed in Ottawa.
This Convention was the result of an unusual series of negotiations.
Originally, the United Nations Conference on Disarmament had
taken the lead in working toward the conclusion of a convention.120 In
1996, however, a number of states and non-governmental
organizations under the umbrella of the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines launched what came be know as the Ottawa
process.121 Under the leadership of the Canadian Government, this
second track moved rapidly toward the conclusion of a Convention
the following year. The Convention entered into force on March 1,
1999, and by December 2004, 144 states had become parties.122 Given
that this Convention relates to the use of mines in the conduct of
armed conflict, this agreement squarely falls into the area of high
politics.
b. Legal Obligations. The basic purpose of the Convention was
the elimination of the use and production of all anti-personnel
landmines. Under Article 1 of the treaty, the parties “undertake
never in any circumstances” “to use,” “develop, produce, otherwise

119. CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND
TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997)
[hereinafter Mine Ban Treaty].
120. Id.
121. This description of the process draws upon ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 644-47 (3d ed. 2002). For more background on the Land
Mine Convention, see Maxwell A. Cameron, TO WALK WITHOUT FEAR passim (Maxwell A.
Cameron, et al., eds., 1998); LANDMINES AND HUMAN SECURITY passim (Richard A. Matthew,
et. al., eds., 2004).
122. See
INT’L
CAMPAIGN
TO
BAN
LANDMINES,
available
at
http://www.icbl.org/treaty/members (last visited Mar. 6, 2006) (delineating members, signature
dates, and entry-into-force dates).
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acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly,
123
anti-personnel mines.”
Following from this general obligation, the parties are required
to destroy all anti- personnel mines in their possession or in areas
124
In preparation for this
under their jurisdiction and control.
destruction, the Convention also requires certain “transparency
125
In particular, all parties are required to disclose
measures.”
appropriate information relating to the number, location, and types of
mines under its control, as well as the status of programs to destroy
such mines.126 The states also agree to take the necessary national
implementation measures to ensure adherence with the agreement.
c. Enforcement Mechanisms. The Convention establishes a
multi-layered approach to facilitate the enforcement of its provisions.
First, it authorizes states to file a formal Request for Clarification if
such state believes that there may be problems relating to the
adherence of another state. This request is initially taken up by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall communicate the
127
If the requesting state does not
request to the requested state.
receive a satisfactory answer through this process, that requesting
state may take the request to a Meeting of the States Parties. At such
a meeting, the States Parties may authorize a fact finding mission to
the requested states to investigate adherence with the agreement.128
Under the terms of Article 8, the requested state is legally obligated
to “grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and
installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance
issue could be expected to be collected.”129 Following this mission, the
States Parties “shall consider all relevant information” and “may
request the requested State Party to take measures to address the
compliance issue within a specified period of time.”130
The

123. Mine Ban Treaty, art. 1. An anti-personnel mine is defined as “a mine designed to be
exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or
kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact
of a Vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not
considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.” Id. art. 2(1).
124. Id. arts. 3-4.
125. Id. arts. 7.
126. Id.
127. Id. art. 8.
128. Id.
129. Id. art. 8(14).
130. Id. art. 8(18).
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Convention does not, however, provide for any form of binding
actions on states that refuse to comply with the recommendations of
the States Parties. Accordingly, it would seem that the strength of the
verification/enforcement regime established by the Convention could
be rated at a “moderate” level.
d. Effect on Sovereignty. The most significant effect of the
Convention on state autonomy is the requirement that states accept
fact-finding missions. While this requirement is not as intrusive as the
inspections regimes contained in some other arms control
131
agreements, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, it is
nonetheless a reasonably intrusive measure. It would thus make
sense to rate the infringement on sovereignty at the level of
“moderate.”
e. Normativity. Over the years before and after the Ottawa
process began, states have seemed to form a strong consensus
regarding the “morally abhorrent” nature of anti-personnel land
mines.132 As will be seen in the statements of states, this perception
seems to cut across a wide-variety of states. Accordingly, the
normativity of the Land Mine Convention would seem to be “high.”
2. Adherence Behavior. Since the Landmine Convention
entered into force, there has been a wide disparity in the level of
adherence from the target states. Given the indicators of adherence,
states can roughly be grouped into four categories: very high, high,
medium, and low.
At the highest end of the spectrum are Australia, Canada and
Germany. These three states were among the leading advocates of
the treaty and moved quickly to fulfill the provisions of the
agreement. Canada, in particular, played the most significant role as
the convener of the Ottawa Process, and has been a consistent
champion of the treaty. Underlying Canadian support for the treaty
seems to be a belief that landmines are simply immoral weapons. As
the Ottawa Process began in 1996, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister
Lloyd Axworthy explained:
We have all been struck by the dedication and dynamism brought
to the discussions by those whose lives have been directly affected

131. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993).
132. See infra notes 133-81 and accompanying text.
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by AP [anti-personnel] mines. They have reminded us that the
issue of AP mines is one of human, not military, security. Their
compelling stories challenge our sense of collective responsibility to
133
eliminate these terrible weapons.

At the Nairobi Review Conference in 2004, Adrienne Clarkson, the
Governor General of Canada, was even more explicit. Using words
like “scourge” and “curse” to refer to landmines, she explained that
Canada and other states had “decided that we will help each other to
put an end to these crude and cruel weapons” at the Ottawa
Conference seven years earlier.134 Clarkson reiterated that these
states decided then “that the killing and maiming of about 26,000
135
Australia seemed to express a
people a year was unacceptable.”
similar attitude toward the nature of landmines and has given some
indication that the supporting the Landmine Treaty was an important
part of Australian identity. At the Ottawa Conference signing
session, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer explained that
“[s]igning the Ottawa Treaty is the quickest, most absolute way for a
government to commit itself to this objective, and it is right that
Australia, with its strong humanitarian record, should take this high
road to a global landmines ban.”136 He asserted:
The Australian Government in April 1996 committed Australia to
support a global ban on anti-personnel landmines and imposed an
indefinite suspension on the operational use of these weapons by
the Australian Defence Force, even though Australia - like the
great majority of the other nations which will sign the Ottawa
Treaty today and tomorrow - has had no association with the
137
indiscriminate or irresponsible use of landmines.

133. News Release, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Canada Offers to Host Treaty Conference to Sign Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines (Oct. 5, 1996),
available at http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication_id=376785&
Language=E.
134. Adrienne Clarkson, Canadian Governor General, Address at the Nairobi Summit on a
Mine-Free World: First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
their Destruction (Dec. 2, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.mines.gc.ca/summit/
GG_Landmines_Convention_Speech-en.asp).
135. Id.
136. Alexander Downer, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Address at the Ministerial
Treaty Signing Conference for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production, and Transfer of Anti-personnel Landmines and on their Destruction (Dec. 3, 1997)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/foreign/1997/lmines_4
dec97.html).
137. Id.
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In the high range are Argentina, France, Japan, South Africa, and the
United Kingdom. All these states have generally fulfilled the
provisions of the treaty and have supported the regime. These states
have provided a variety of explanations for their adherence to the
treaty. In general, they seem to fall into two broad categories; a
perception that landmines are so morally repugnant that they must be
prohibited and a belief that landmines are a major obstacle to
international development.
France, for example, notes both issues. It has described these
weapons as “inhumane” and has emphasized the development aspect
138
of the treaty. At the Review Conference in 2004, the delegate from
France noted that what brought the parties together was a “common
fight against one of the most cruel scourge [sic] that mankind has ever
known.”139 He also went on to indicate that one of the major
problems with landmine proliferation was that it “constitute[d] a
140
major factor of destabilization and a hindrance to development.”
The Japanese seem to have taken the immoral aspect of the weapons
to an even greater level, comparing the nature of landmines to the use
of nuclear weapons in Japan during World War II.141 South Africa
also seems especially concerned about the obstructions to
development, indicating that a landmine-free Africa is a prerequisite
for development in that continent.142
More interesting, however, are those states in the medium range:
Brazil, Nigeria, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. Brazil and
Nigeria both signed and ratified the treaty but only moderately
adhered. Brazil was slow in its involvement with the Ottawa Process
138. Xavier Darcos, French Minister of State for Cooperation, Development and
Francophony, Statement at the Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World: First Review
Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Dec. 2, 2004),
http://www.reviewconference.org/fileadmin/pdf/review_conference/other_languages/RC_F_Fre
nch/high_level/France_HLS_RC2004_fr.pdf.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Katsuyuki Kawai, Japanese Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Statement at
The Nairobi Summit on Mine-Free World: First Review Conference of the States Parties to the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction (Dec. 2, 2004), http://www.reviewconference.org/
fileadmin/pdf/review_conference/high_level/Japan_HLS_RC2004.pdf.
142. H.E. Mlulecki George, South African Deputy Minister of Defense, Statement at The
Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World: First Review Conference of the States Parties to the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction (Dec. 2, 2004), http://www.reviewconference.org/
fileadmin/pdf/review_conference/high_level/South_Africa_HLS_RC2004_en.pdf.
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but ultimately did engage.143 While Brazil destroyed its stockpile of
mines in January 2003, it retained 16,545 mines for training
144
purposes—making it the state possessing the most of such mines.
Nigeria was also not initially engaged in the Ottawa Process but with
the change of regimes in 1999, “Nigeria began making positive
statements regarding the Mine Ban Treaty.”145 While Nigeria has
indicated that it destroyed its stockpiles of mines by 2001, there is
146
some evidence to the contrary. Ukraine is behind both Brazil and
Nigeria with respect to adherence. It has signed but not ratified the
treaty and still has about 6 million mines to destroy.147 The main hold
148
up seems to be the lack of funding for such destruction operations.
In their public statements, all these states seem to be strongly
supportive of the treaty regime.
But in this moderate category, Russia and the United States are
the most interesting cases. Neither state has signed or ratified the
convention, yet they have both exhibited a degree of adherence to the
treaty. Why would a state still exhibit some level of adherence to a
treaty when it has not signed or ratified the treaty? The United
States, for example, has indicated that it did not want to be bound by
the treaty and has made it clear that as a matter of policy, it would
continue to maintain the right to use “non-persistent”149 anti150
personnel mines indefinitely. In a State Department release from

143. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Brazil, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/brazil.
144. Id.
145. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Nigeria, available at http://www.icbl.org/
lm/2004/nigeria.
146. In the Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Nigeria states that “slides presented to States
Parties in May 2002 indicated Nigeria still had antipersonnel mines in stocks.” Id.
147. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Ukraine, available at http://www.icbl.org/
lm/2004/ukraine.
148. See id.
149. Non-persistent mines are those that self-destruct or deactivate after a given time
period. See Dept. of Defense, Global Message (Mar. 2, 2004), available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040302.html [hereinafter Global Message].
150. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, United States of America, available at
http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/usa. The Clinton Administration was more favorably disposed
toward the treaty. While Clinton did not sign the treaty, his Administration indicated that the
United States planned to become a party in 2006 as long as certain alternatives were made
available. However, as the Landmine Monitor reported: “Following a two-and-one-half year
review, the Bush Administration announced a new landmine policy on 27 February 2004 that
abandons the long-held U.S. objective of joining the Mine Ban Treaty eventually and instead
allows the military to retain antipersonnel mines indefinitely. This reverses the previous policy
announced by the Clinton Administration to join the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006, as long as
suitable alternatives to antipersonnel mine had been identified and fielded.” Id.
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February 2004, the Administration explained that the United States
will not join the Treaty “because its terms would have required the
U.S. to give up a needed military capability. . . . Landmines still have
a valid and essential role protecting United States forces in military
operations. . . . No other weapon currently exists that provides all the
capabilities provided by landmines.”151
In essence, the United States refused to sign the treaty purely for
security reasons; it was regarded as limiting the nation’s flexibility to
use the military means necessary for its defense. Not surprisingly, the
United States was also generally opposed to the Ottawa Process and
preferred to work through the Committee on Disarmament in the
Yet despite this initial
initial efforts to secure a treaty.152
unwillingness to formally become a party to the treaty and renounce
the use and stockpiling of landmines entirely, it seems as though
American behavior has changed significantly since the adoption of
the treaty. First, the United States made pledges to use only nonpersistent mines.153 Second, the United States “cleared its protective
minefields at the Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba in 1999, and
154
now claims not to maintain minefields anywhere in the world.”
According to the Landmine Monitor Report of 2004, “U.S. mine
action funding [for demining and other purposes] totaled $421.4
million between fiscal years 1999 and 2003, the largest total for any
government.”155 Third, the State Department created Office of
Humanitarian Demining Programs that subsequently became part of
156
If the United
the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement.

151. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, New United States
Policy on Landmines: Reducing Humanitarian Risk and Saving Lives of United States Soldiers
(Feb. 27, 2004), http://www.acq.osd.mil/ds/sa/lwm/publications/Fact%20Sheet%20(Landmine
%20Policy).pdf.
152. Id.
153. Global Message, supra note 149. In a recent report, the Department of State portrayed
the Bush Administration’s policy as demonstrating leadership in this area: “The Administration
developed a new landmine policy that commits us to be the first major military power to stop
using land mines that are persistent or undetectable to metal detectors. The new policy
reinforces the long-standing U.S. leadership role in—and a commitment to—curbing the
humanitarian problems caused by indiscriminate use of landmines and opens the door for
possible international dialogue on a prohibition on the sale or export of persistent landmines.”
Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Arms Control, The Arms Control Philosophy and
Accomplishments of the Bush Administration, Bureau of Arms Control, Department of State
(Feb. 11, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/42200.htm.
154. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, United States of America, supra note 150.
155. Id.
156. Id. The Landmine Monitor Report noted this development:
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States is unwilling to ratify the treaty, why would it then adhere to
any extent?
An examination of the public statements of the United States
seems to reveal several reasons for supporting the spirit of the treaty.
First, although other states have expressed a concern that landmines
are an impediment to international development, the United States
has indicated that its demining activities are important to advancing
that goal. In a report entitled, To Walk the Earth in Safety, released
by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the State Department in
2004, the United States explained its “commitment to help rid the
157
world of landmines that threaten civilians around the world.” The
report noted:
This effort supports the U.S. Strategic Objectives to advance
sustainable development and global interests by providing a
humanitarian response to the harmful social and economic effects
generated by landmines and unexploded ordnance and to advance
peace and security by promoting regional stability through the use
of mine action as a confidence-building measure. Accordingly, the
United States helps to reduce the number of civilian landmine
casualties, return refugees and internally displaced persons
threatened by landmines to their homes and enhance the political
158
and economic stability of those countries affected by landmines.

It would thus seem that motivations of the United States include a
desire to promote international development, a belief that regional
stability will be established if states are less likely to have landmines
exploding, and a sense that if the United States engages in demining
efforts, states might be more likely to cooperate with the United
States in general.

Concurrent with the formation of the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, a
set of “revitalized goals” for how the U.S. as a donor treats requests for humanitarian
mine action assistance from affected countries and the “measurable goals” by which
programs are evaluated have been articulated. During the review process leading to
the new landmine policy, President Bush directed the State Department to develop a
new strategic plan for the U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program. The U.S.
humanitarian mine action strategic plan will serve to advance humanitarian interests
and protect the U.S. by promoting regional security. It uses four factors to determine
to whom and to what degree the U.S. provides assistance: humanitarian need, foreign
policy interests, efficiency and transparency of the recipient’s national mine action
program, and the recipient’s commitment to demining.
Id.
157. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal
& Abatement, The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Mine Action: To Walk the
Earth in Safety 10 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/
2004/37224.htm.
158. Id.
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Russia has also demonstrated a moderate level of adherence.
Much like the United States, it preferred the efforts undertaken in the
Conference on Disarmament to the Ottawa Process, and it continues
to maintain the right to use landmines. In November of 2003, the
chief Russian diplomat to a review conference on the Convention on
Conventional Weapons indicated that “the world without mines
remains to be our goal. However, as we repeatedly pointed out, the
movement to that noble goal should be realistic, we should proceed
stage-by-stage while ensuring the necessary level of stability.”159
Russia has also in practice used landmines in Chechnya, Dagestan,
160
Tajikistan, and along the Russian-Georgian Border.
Despite its use of mines, Russia also became active in demining
work. The Landmine Monitor Report noted that “[i]n 2000, the
government formed a Federal Working Group for Mine Action and
appointed a special coordinator on humanitarian demining to
coordinate activities within various state agencies related to
161
Subsequently, “[i]n
international humanitarian mine clearance.”
June 2003, it was reported that a new Counter Mine Danger Service
had been established under the Russian Federation Engineer Forces
to integrate military and civilian mine action-related elements.”162 The
following November, “[a] Russian official stated . . . that a Center of
Demining had been established ‘on the basis of the Moscow
University of Military Engineers in order to train experts in detecting
and clearing of explosive devices.’”163
Russia’s unwillingness to become a party to the treaty and to
fully adhere to its stems both from a belief in the military value of
landmines and a concern regarding the cost of their destruction. As
the Landmine Monitor Report of 2004 explained, “[Russia’s] longheld reservations to joining the treaty include its perception of the
utility of antipersonnel mines and of the lack of viable alternatives,
and its potential inability to meet the financial commitment to destroy
the country’s considerable stockpile of antipersonnel mines within

159. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Russia, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/russia
(citing Anatoly Antonov, Russian Ambassador-at-Large, Statement at the Fifth Annual
Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II (Nov. 20, 2003)).
160. Id.
161. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Russia, supra note 159.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing a statement issued by Russia at the CCW Amended Protocol II Conference
on Nov. 26, 2003).
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four years, as required by the treaty.”164 Thus, this reflects both a
realist concern for security but also a simple practical concern that, at
times, states simply cannot afford to comply with treaty requirements.
Why, however, would Russia wish to adhere to any aspects of the
treaty regime? Based on official statements, Russia seems to be
concerned about the horrific nature of mines. In a speech before the
United Nations Security Council in November 2003, the Russian
delegate explained:
The Russian Federation attaches great importance to the whole
range of problems related to mine action. We support United
Nations efforts to mobilize the international community to address
the issue of the danger posed by mines. Russia is acquainted from
bitter experience with the tragedy and suffering caused by the
uncontrolled use of mines. Despite the fact that more than a half a
century has elapsed since the end of the Second World War,
Russia’s Ministry of Defence and Ministry for Emergency
Situations disarms tens of thousands of pieces of unexploded
165
ordnance every year.

In the low range, which represents states that have done very little to
adhere to the agreement, are six states: China, Egypt, India, Iran,
Israel, and Pakistan. None of these states have signed or ratified the
agreement, and they seem to be quite far from fulfilling the provisions
of the treaty. China was one of the largest producers of landmines
and had been one of the world’s largest exporters of landmines.166
While there are indications that China has stopped exporting mines
and ceased production, the country continues to possess a very large
stockpile of the weapons.167 Egypt reportedly has large stockpiles of
landmines and, while it claimed to have ceased export of them in
2000, the Landmine Monitor concluded that Egypt is still producing
the weapons.168 India continues to produce and stockpile landmines
and has “laid large numbers of mines along its border with Pakistan
between December 2001 and July 2002, in one of the biggest minelaying operations anywhere in the world.”169 Iran is in a very similar
position.
Evidence suggests that Iran continued to produce
landmines in 1999 and 2000, and the Landmine Monitor noted that

164. Id.
165. UN SCOR, 58th Sess., 4858th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4858 (Nov. 13, 2003)
(transcribing the statement of Mr. Konuzin, representing the Russian Federation).
166. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, China, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/china.
167. Id.
168. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Egypt, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/egypt.
169. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, India, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/india.
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“Iran is believed to maintain minefields along its borders with Iraq,
170
Israel, likewise, possesses landmines
Afghanistan, and Pakistan.”
and seems to have a number deployed along various borders.171 It
reportedly ceased production and has “renewed an export
172
moratorium until 2005.” Pakistan continues to be a manufacturer of
landmines and has deployed them in a number of cases, including
along the Indian border.173
The main reason these states continue to refrain from formal
participation in the treaty regime is clear. All acknowledge the
military utility of landmines. And in all those cases, they have states
that are perceived to be hostile or potentially hostile at their borders.
This view seems clearly reinforced by statements over the years. Iran,
for example, had no hesitation declaring in 2003 that “[l]andmines
continue to be the sole effective means to ensure the minimum
security requirements of borders in countries with long land
borders.”174 Similarly, Pakistan has consistently stated “that the use of
landmines is part of its self-defense strategy and it opposes a ban until
viable alternatives are developed.” 175 India, which shares the border
with Pakistan, has taken a virtually identical position. They will
continue to possess mines for self-defense, until such times when
alternative technologies are available.176 These reasons seem perfect

170. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Iran, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/iran.
171. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Israel, available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/israel.
172. Id.
173. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Pakistan, available at http://www.icbl.org/
lm/2004/pakistan.
174. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Iran, supra note 170 (citing The Islamic Republic of
Iran: Draft Resolution L.43 on “Ottawa Convention,” Permanent Mission of Iran to the United
Nations, New York, July 2, 2003).
175. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Pakistan, supra note 173, (citing Explanation of Vote
on Draft UNGA Resolution A/C.1/57/L.36 (Oct. 23, 2002); Letter from the Joint Staff
Headquarters to the Coordinator of the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL),
Strategic Plan Division, ADCA Directorate, Chaklala Cantonment, (Feb. 14, 2002); Statement
by Fouzia Nasreen, Ambassador of Pakistan to Nepal, South Asia LM Meeting, (Jan. 29, 2001);
and Letter to ICBL (Stephen Goose) from Amb. Inam ul Haque, Pakistan Mission to UN, New
York, (Nov. 15, 1999)).
176. India remains committed to the pursuit of the ultimate objective of a nondiscriminatory, universal and global ban on anti-personnel mines in a manner that addresses the
legitimate defense requirements of states. India believes that the process of complete
elimination of anti-personnel mines will be facilitated by the availability of appropriate
militarily-effective, non-lethal and cost-effective alternative technologies. This will enable the
legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines for operational requirements to be
addressed, thereby furthering our objective. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, India, supra
note 169 (citing Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Head of Indian Delegation, Statement at the Fifth
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examples of structural realism. Because states see landmines as
necessary for their security, they will not abandon their use as long as
they have some kind of military utility.
But even among these states that exhibit low adherence, some of
them have undertaken certain measures that support the treaty
177
178
regime. India and Pakistan, for example, have participated in
demining efforts throughout the world. But of this group, China
seems to stand out as the one state that has become much more
engaged in the process. As the Landmine Monitor reported, China
has taken a number of steps since 2003:
China, together with the China Arms Control and Disarmament
Association and the Australian Network of ICBL, hosted the
“Humanitarian
Mine/UXO
Clearance
Technology
and
Cooperation Workshop” at Kunming on 26-28 April 2004. China
joined the donors’ Mine Action Support Group. In November
2003, an official stated that China has thus far destroyed over
400,000 old mines that did not meet the technical requirements of
CCW Amended Protocol II. China has reiterated its support for
“the ultimate goal of a total ban on antipersonnel mines.” In
December 2003, the International Committee of the Red Cross, in
cooperation with the Red Cross Society of China, established a
179
prosthetic center in Kunming.

China has also made a number of statements in support of a ban on
antipersonnel mines. In September of 2003, an official noted that:
[t]he Chinese government attaches great importance to
humanitarian issues and supports the efforts by the international
community in addressing the humanitarian problems caused by
landmines. . . . There is no denying that banning antipersonnel
mines (APLs) can be the ultimate way to prevent them from
injuring civilians and address the humanitarian concerns arising

Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on
Conventional Weapons (Nov. 26, 2003)).
177. “India reports that its Corps of Engineers has over many years assisted with UNsponsored mine clearance programs in Cambodia, Bosnia, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.” Id.
178. Pakistan contributed to mine action operations in Afghanistan (1989-91), Kuwait (post1991 Gulf War), Cambodia (1992-93), Angola (1995-98), Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Western
Sahara, mostly as part of the U.N. peacekeeping contingents. In November 2003 Pakistan said
that it was assisting with demining operations in Lebanon, Sierra Leone and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, Pakistan, supra note 173.
179. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, China, supra note 166.
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thereof. To those states that have chosen to do so, we express our
180
respect and appreciation.

And in a statement before the United Nations Security Council, the
Chinese representative explained: “Although China has yet to accede
to the Ottawa Convention, we identify ourselves with the purposes of
the Convention and support the ultimate goal of a total ban on
181
antipersonnel mines.” While it is difficult to draw any conclusions
from China’s willingness to express some level of support for the
treaty regime, the rhetoric seems to connect to some of the views
expressed by other states about the overall nature of these weapons.
3. Validation of Theories. In reviewing the motivations for
adherence and non-adherence, there are two dominate theoretical
explanations: structural realism and constructivism. Realism seems to
explain why states would refuse to sign and ratify. States like the
United States, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, India, and Israel perceive the
treaty to be too constraining on their right to defend themselves.
Those states that have signed, ratified, and generally adhered to the
legal obligations contained in the treaty seem to be motivated by a
belief that these weapons are inhumane. This is linked to the notion
that states’ identities would lead them to do away with such weapons.
Indeed, even countries like the United States that have not signed
and ratified, still adhere to much of the treaty, perhaps because of this
same sense of identity. Hegemonic stability theory also seems to be
consistent with the behavior of the United States.
C. The World Trade Organization
1.

Overview of the Treaty Regime.

a. Background.
The World Trade Organization was
established in 1995 following the conclusion of the so-called
182
“Uruguay Round” of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

180. Id. (citing Fu Cong, Deputy Director-General of Arms Control and Disarmament
Department, Statement at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty (Sept. 19,
2003)).
181. Id. (citing Zhang Yishan, quoted in UN Security Council, S/PV.4858, 4858th meeting,
“Agenda: The importance of mine action for peacekeeping operations” (Nov. 13, 2003)).
182. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter General Agreement or GATT].
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(GATT) negotiations.183 The Organization was formalized in the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO
184
Charter), which establishes the structure, scope, and functions of
the organization. The purpose of the Organization is to provide an
institutional framework for the GATT and to expand into a variety of
other areas, including services and intellectual property.185 As a
consequence, a number of other agreements set the rule base for the
WTO. Of particular importance are the GATT, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),186 and the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).187
Underlying these agreements are the principles of Most-Favored
Nation Treatment and National Treatment. These agreements and
other related ones set forth detailed procedures for reviewing state
trade policies and resolving disputes arising under these
arrangements.
Of the treaty regimes explored in this Article, the WTO is unique
with respect to its membership. Currently, there are 148 members
within the organization. What is unusual is that one of its most
powerful members is not a state, but rather the “European
Communities,”—as the European Union is referred to in WTO
parlance. It participated as a member of the GATT Rounds since
188
During
1960 and was a founding member of the WTO.
negotiations, it behaves as a unitary actor and, as will be discussed
below, participates in the dispute-settlement mechanism. Of the
target states, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are
members of the EU.189

183. On the development of the GATT and the origins of the WTO, see JOHN H. JACKSON,
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS (MIT Press 2d ed. 1997).
184. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
185. See overview of WTO website, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
186. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS].
187. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
188. Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and
Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 249 n.17 (2004).
189. It is also interesting to note that “Chinese Taipei,” the Republic of China, is also a
member of the WTO.
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b. Legal Obligations. The two main substantive key obligations
embodied in the agreements establishing the rule base for the WTO
are Most Favored Nation Treatment and National Treatment. Most
Favored Nation Treatment, as established in the GATT, GATS, and
TRIPS agreements, means that states pledge to treat all other states
as well as they treat their best trading partner. The GATT, for
example, provides:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with
respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation
and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in
190
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.

Similar provisions are echoed in GATS191 and TRIPS.192 The second
main substantive obligation is National Treatment. In essence,
National Treatment means that the parties must treat non-nationals
in the same manner as nationals. The TRIPS notes, with a few
established exceptions, “[e]ach Member shall accord to the nationals
of other Members treatment no less favorable than that it accords to
its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual
property[.]”193
c. Enforcement Mechanisms.
In addition to these main
substantive obligations, the agreements falling under the umbrella of
the WTO also establish extensive procedures with respect to dispute
resolution. One of the agreements reached at the Uruguay Round
was the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
194
This agreement provides for the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU).
establishment of a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which oversees
complaints about non-adherence made by states. In the first instance,

190. GATT art. 1.
191. GATS art. 2.
192. TRIPS art. 4.
193. Id. art. 3.
194. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1225 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
On the settlement of disputes under the WTO, see Steinberg, supra note 188.
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states are to attempt to present their complaints directly to other
states during informal consultations. If those consultations fail, the
complaining state may request the creation of a panel. Once the
panel reaches a conclusion, it files a report that is then submitted to
the DSB for adoption. Following the adoption of the panel report, a
party to the dispute may take the matter to the Standing Appellate
Body for review.
The status of the recommendations of the panel and Appellate
Body is somewhat unclear. The DSU does not explicitly state that
such recommendations are binding upon states.195 But, as John
Jackson observes, “[w]hen one analyzes the DSU . . . it is possible to
find a number of separate clauses that in context seem to strongly
imply or ‘add up to’ the obligation to conform to panel/appellate
report[s] in violation cases.”196
But perhaps one of the most significant enforcement provisions
established under the WTO is the allowance for retaliation by an
aggrieved state. Under Article 22 of the DSU, if a state fails to
comply with a decision brought through the dispute settlement
procedures, the complaining state “may request authorization from
the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of
197
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.” In
other words, the state has the right to effectively engage in a
“reprisal” against the non-compliant state. Given these extensive
procedures for the enforcement of the regime, the strength of the
verification/enforcement arrangement established by the WTO can
be rated at a “high” level.
d. Effect on Sovereignty. The World Trade Organization and
its related agreements have had a profound effect on the autonomy of
states. Because of the complex linkages in trade, services, and
intellectual property, the Organization connects every state and
makes it very difficult for them to behave outside the treaty regime
without suffering repercussions. In particular, because complaining
states have the right to ask to revoke concessions or other obligations
195. John Jackson explains the difficulty: “One interesting question arising in the context of
the DSU is whether a party that has been the subject of a complaint for a violation case has an
international legal obligation to follow the recommendations or determinations of the panel
report or appellate report that results from the process. Unlike other international tribunal
proceedings, such as the World Court, the DSU does not make this entirely explicit.” JACKSON,
supra note 183, at 126.
196. Id.
197. DSU art. 22.
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they may have granted to a violating state, reciprocal enforcement
can take place in the absence of a formal centralized enforcement
body. As a consequence, the infringement of the regime on the
sovereignty of states can be rated as “high.”
e. Normativity. It is very difficult to evaluate the normativity of
the WTO regime. Even though certain norms such as “free trade,”
“most favored nation” status, and “national treatment” underlie the
legal obligations of the regime, there is no clear evidence that these
principles enjoy any kind of moral efficacy. In fact, indications seem
to suggest that the WTO was established under the strong influence
of the United States and the European Union, acting to promote their
198
own interests. While it could be argued that the authoritativeness
of the regime is high inasmuch as the WTO principles were those
found in the GATT of 1947 and had thus been a part of international
law, the difficulty of subsequent efforts to incorporate these principles
in other areas—such as agriculture—would call into question their
authoritativeness. It also seems that there may not be universal
agreement about the fairness of the regime. Nonetheless, as noted
earlier, the WTO has extensive membership and a number of other
states seeking to join the regime, all of which would seem to indicate
a widespread level of legitimacy. 199 As a consequence of these
conflicting indicators, the normativity of the regime seems uncertain.
2. Adherence Behavior. Given the empirical analysis, states fall
into three categories: high, medium, and low. Thirteen states fall into
the high range: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt,
France, Germany, India, Japan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the United
Kingdom. Two actors fall into the medium range: the European
Community and the United States. And three states fall into the low
200
range: Iran, Russia, and Ukraine.

198. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
199. We are indebted to our colleague Gustavo Adolfo Flores-Macias for noting this factor
and assisting in the formulations of this section.
200. These determinations were made based on the parties’ willingness to comply with the
provisions of the WTO agreements. The three states in the low range have not yet become
parties to the WTO. The EC and the United States are listed in the medium range because in
both cases, these two parties have had adverse decisions by the dispute settlement mechanism,
have failed to comply with those decisions, and have had sanctions authorized against them.
The states in the high range have complied with the provisions of the WTO and have ultimately
carried out any decisions by the dispute settlement bodies.
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Adherence to the WTO regime has been quite strong among the
target states. From the perspective of the most basic indicator of
adherence—signature and ratification, only three of the target
states—Iran, Russia, and Ukraine—are not parties to the WTO
regime. And these states are seeking membership. When a state
makes such an application, the first positive step is the establishment
of a “working party.” In the case of Iran, however:
[D]iscussions through the period under review made clear that
although a large part of the membership continued to be supportive
of an early and positive action on this request on the basis of the
provisions in Article XII of the WTO Agreement, there was no
consensus at this time to accept Iran’s request and to set up a
201
working party for this purpose.

With respect to other indicators of adherence, the WTO has a
different type of treaty regime than the others examined. First, as
noted above, the WTO is an international organization that imposes
certain legal obligations on the parties and provides a comprehensive
dispute settlement mechanism for resolving questions relating to
adherence with those provisions. Second, the WTO also serves as a
framework for on-going trade negotiations seeking to implement the
basic free-trade principles of the organization in other substantive
areas. Accordingly, adherence to the provisions of the regime needs
to be understood both in terms of compliance with existing legal
obligations and the willingness to participate in these on-going
negotiations.
From the perspective of general adherence, one of the strongest
indicators of adherence is the willingness of states to engage and
accept the dispute settlement mechanism established by the
Organization.
Since the WTO was established in 1995, 330
complaints were brought to the dispute settlement body. Not
surprisingly, the target states are among the most significant users of
the procedure.202 The most frequent user of the system was the
United States, bringing eighty cases and serving as a respondent in
eighty-eight. It was followed by the European Communities, bringing
sixty-eight cases and responding to fifty-one. Canada was next with
twenty-six complaints brought, and thirteen cases as respondent.
201. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNUAL REPORT (2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep05_e.pdf
[hereinafter
ANNUAL
REPORT 2005].
202. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF DISPUTES CASES,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (number of cases is as of Nov.
2005) (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
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Brazil brought twenty-two cases and was a respondent in twelve.
India brought sixteen cases and was a respondent in seventeen. Japan
brought twelve and was a respondent in fourteen. Argentina brought
nine cases and was a respondent in fifteen. Australia brought five
cases and has been a respondent in seven. The other states have been
involved in relatively few cases: China brought one and was a
respondent in one; Egypt was a respondent in four; France was a
respondent in two; Pakistan brought three cases and was a
respondent in one case; South Africa was a respondent in two cases;
and Great Britain was a respondent in one case. Given this large
number of cases brought before the WTO, compliance has been
remarkable. As the 2005 Report notes:
Members have, in general, implemented the recommendations and
rulings made by the panels and by the Appellate Body in the
‘reasonable period of time’ determined under Article 21.3 of the
DSU. This is an achievement and a success; the WTO Members
203
believe in the WTO dispute settlement system and respect it.

In the first decade of the WTO’s existence, there have been only
seven cases in which one of the parties refused to implement the
decisions of the panel or Appellate Body, and the Dispute Settlement
Body authorized retaliation by the complaining state. Interestingly
enough, all of these cases involve one or more of the target states.
The first was brought by the United States and Canada against the
EC for its ban on meat and meat products, known as the ECHormones case.204 Based on the authorization, both Canada and the
United States took retaliatory measures. The second was brought by
the United States and Ecuador for a banana regime set up by the EC,
known as the EC-Bananas III case.205 In that case, even though
Ecuador was authorized to suspend concessions, the parties were able
to resolve the dispute before such action was undertaken. The third
case was brought by Canada against Brazil and related to export
206
financing for aircraft, known as the Brazil-Aircraft case. The fourth
case was brought by the EC against the United States and related to

203. ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note 201, at 145.
204. Arbitrator’s Decision, European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products, WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999).
205. Appellate Body Report, European Communities Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Bananas III].
206. Panel Report, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/RW/2
(July 26, 2001) [hereinafter Brazil Aircraft].
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Foreign Sales Corporations.207 The fifth case was brought by Brazil
against Canada and dealt with export credit and loan guarantees for
aircraft. The sixth case was brought by the EC against the United
States for the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act. In that case, the EC was
208
concerned that the Anti-Dumping Act violated the obligations of
the United States under the WTO. The Bush Administration
essentially agreed with this claim and undertook efforts to repeal the
Act. But those efforts have, to date, been unsuccessful and the
United States remains in violation. Some aspects of the case went on
to arbitration and despite a finding for the EC, they have not yet
suspended concessions. Finally, the seventh case209 was brought by
Brazil, Canada, Chile, the EC, India, Japan, Korea, and Mexico
against the United States because of the U.S.-Offset Act, the socalled Byrd Amendment.210
Given the total number of cases brought before the WTO, the
rate of compliance seems extraordinarily high. And what is perhaps
most significant is that even in those cases where states disagreed with
the rules of the Dispute Settlement Body, they still actively engaged
the process. In the case of the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act, the executive
branch even worked to attempt to secure new legislation that would
put the country in compliance with the WTO obligations. What has
not been seen at the WTO is the kind of behavior that a structural
realist might expect—states have not left the organization or seriously
threatened to leave when faced with an adverse decision. Instead,
they have worked within the organization to make their case,

207. Arbitrator’s Decision, United States Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,”
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30,
2002) [hereinafter FSC Article 22.6 Report]; Appellate Body Report, United States Tax
Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”—Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the
European Communities, WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002).
208. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, tit. VII, §801, 39 Stat. 798-99 (1916) (15 U.S.C. 72) (2000 &
Supp. II 2004)) [hereinafter 1916 Act].
209. Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000, WT/DS217, 234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003); see Jesse Klaproth, Comment, Decision by the
Arbitrator—United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000: Payback is for
the Byrds; Arbitrator Allows Eight Countries to Sanction the United States for Application of the
Byrd Amendment, 13 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 401 (2005).
210. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549 (2000)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §1675c) (2004)) [hereinafter Byrd Amendment]. For a discussion of the
Byrd Amendment, see Clarie Hervey, Note, The Byrd Amendment Battle: American Trade
Politics at the WTO, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 131 (2004); Meredith Schutzman,
Note, Antidumping and the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000: A Renewed
Debate, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1069 (2004).
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challenge rulings, seek time extensions, compromises, and almost
always comply at the end of the day.
In addition to this indicator of adherence, another way in which
adherence with the WTO regime has been demonstrated is through
the participation of member states in the on-going negotiations on a
variety of other trade issues. Since the Organization was formally
established, there have been five ministerial conferences that have
sought to strengthen the WTO regime. The most significant
development from these conferences was the adoption of the Doha
211
Development Agenda (DDA) in Doha, Qatar in November of 2001.
The DDA set the agenda for subsequent ministerial conferences and
the framework for negotiations. Although efforts to fully implement
the Doha agenda have been slower than anticipated, the target states
have all continued to be actively engaged and invested in the
regime.212 If this adherence behavior seems so strong, why has this
been the case? Why have states chosen to follow the requirements of
the WTO?
The WTO regime is perhaps the quintessential neoliberal
regime. The WTO seeks to create a regime in which all the parties
are able to realize their long-term economic interests through a rulebased, transparent system with highly sophisticated enforcement
mechanisms. In examining the many statements made by members
and observer states about the Organization, this motivation seems to
be most consistent among the target states. For example, several
statements made at the most recent Ministerial Conference held in
Cancún, Mexico in 2003 clearly reflect a neoliberal understanding of
the WTO. The Japanese Minster for Foreign Affairs explained:
The WTO accords us with a set of rules which ensures that the
benefits of trade liberalization will be shared by all, including
developing countries. It also constitutes a rule-based system where
the strongest is not necessarily assured of reaping benefits but
where a fairer distribution of benefits is secured. This world body
provides us with a universal platform that integrates diverse
Members and prevents us from falling into the trap of the
compartmentalization of world trade through the proliferation of
regional trade agreements. What we should aim to achieve through

211. For an overview of the Doha Development Agenda, see WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, NEGOTIATIONS, IMPLEMENTATION, AND DEVELOPMENT: THE DOHA
AGENDA, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
212. See the International Chamber of Commerce’s comment on the slow pace of Doha:
ICC Secretary General stresses need for progress as trade negotiators meet in Geneva,
http://www.iccwbo.org/iccdcbd/index.html.
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the Doha Development Agenda, is to strengthen this system to
213
expand world trade in a balanced way.

Similarly, the Israeli Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Industry,
Trade, Labor and Communications explained that the delegates
“must bear in mind and follow the core principles that led the WTO
and the multilateral trading system to consistent and progressive
liberalization throughout the years namely: a rule-based system;
consensus-based decision-making mechanism; non-discrimination;
transparency; progressive liberalization; and special and differential
treatment for developing countries.”214 Almost as if he was reading
from a neoliberal article on absolute gains, the British Minister for
Trade, Investment and Foreign Affairs spoke about a need for “[a]
properly functioning, multilateral trading system, based on consensus
and enforceable rules, provides all countries, large and small, with the
potential to pursue those opportunities and increase their
prosperity.”215
The United States has also echoed a neoliberal understanding of
the benefits reaped from the WTO. In a speech delivered in May of
2004, for example, United States Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick made it clear that a rule-based system of free trade provided
benefits to all states, but was clearly a system of reciprocal sacrifice
and benefit. Zoellick explained that “we must seek balanced
216
solutions that involve give and take from everyone.” “We know,”
Zoellick continued, “that if we move forward together, all our nations
217
In the spirit of trade-offs, Zoellick
will be better off.”
acknowledged that the United States has made certain sacrifices in
exchange for the benefits of a free-trade regime and other developed
countries should do the same.218 Zoellick explained that “[t]he

213. H.E. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Statement by Japan at the World Trade Organization
Ministerial Conference, Fifth Session Cancún, WT/MIN(03)/ST/23 (Sept. 11, 2003),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/statements_e/st23.pdf.
214. H.E. Ehud Olmert, Statement by Israel at the World Trade Organization Ministerial
Conference, Fifth Session Cancún, WT/MIN(03)/ST/45, (Sept. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/statements_e/st45.pdf.
215. Mike O’Brien, Statement by United Kingdom at the World Trade Organization
Ministerial Conference, Fifth Session Cancún, WT/MIN(03)/ST/11, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/statements_e/st11.pdf.
216. Robert Zoellick, United States Trade Representative, A Strategic Opportunity for
Trade, Address at the Salon de Boffrands du Senat (May 13, 2004), available at
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/USTR_Zoellick_Sp
eeches/2004/A_Strategic_Opportunity_for_Trade.html.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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present openness of the United States is reflected, in part, through
our $542 billion current account deficit; with a surplus of imports over
exports of that magnitude, our market cannot be too hard to
access.”219 He continued by noting:
President Bush has been clear that the United States will continue
to stand for openness, dynamism, and growth. He knows America
needs to open new markets to create new jobs for workers at home.
He also knows that more open trade is critical to offer developing
countries the opportunity to move beyond the dependency of the
past. The Doha negotiations remain the central goal of our trade
strategy. The President’s strong commitment to the free trade
agenda, even in the midst of an election year, should bolster the
commitments of those who wonder whether America is serious in
its offers to eliminate agricultural export subsidies, slash tradedistorting farm subsidies, cut drastically the tariffs on goods and
220
agriculture, and expand services trade. We mean what we say.

Zoellick then went on to emphasize that “we need more help from
other important developed nations, too,”221 and called upon the
222
and Japan223 in particular to make certain
European Union
sacrifices. Hegemonic stability theory may also underlie U.S. and—
EC adherence to the regime. When the WTO was being established
in 1995, the United States and the EC exerted a tremendous amount
of influence vis-à-vis the other participants in the GATT.224 Both
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. (“[T]he world will depend on Europe remaining an engaged leader in international
trade[.]”).
223. Id. (“Japan should play a role in Doha more commensurate with the size of its
economy and its place in the global trading system.”).
224. Richard Steinberg provided a quick summary of the role played by the U.S. and the EC
in the establishment of the WTO:
The European Communities and the United States have dominated GATT/WTO
decision making since the 1960s. Their capacity to bring about constitutional change is
illustrated by the successful EC-U.S. effort to close the Uruguay Round through a
legal-political maneuver that imposed various agreements on weaker powers. Closure
was achieved by employing the enormous market power of the European
Communities and the United States, whose markets make up about 65 percent of the
combined gross domestic product of WTO members. Upon the conclusion of the
round, the European Communities and the United States entered into the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, which included the GATT 1994 and its
most-favored-nation (MFN guarantee, and required adherence to all the WTO
multilateral agreements, including TRIPS, which most developing countries had
previously refused to sign. Shortly thereafter, the European Communities and the
United States withdrew from GATT 1947, disengaging from that agreements MFN
commitment to developing countries. This maneuver, which closed the Uruguay
Round by means of a single undertaking, presented the developing countries with a
fait accompli: either sign on to the entire WTO package or lose the legal basis for
continued access to the enormous European and U.S. markets. From the time the
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players sought to create a trade regime that would lock in place rules
that were seen to be in their interests. As Richard Steinberg notes,
the United States was particularly desirous of moving away from the
more diplomatic approach to dispute resolution that existed under
the GATT and creating a more legalized approach that would affirm
important aspects of the American approach to trade:
The switch from GATT DSU to automatic, binding dispute
resolution and the establishment of an Appellate Body were seen
by the United States as an opportunity to foster compliance with a
set of comprehensive substantive commitments that would result
from the Uruguay Round. The United States considered it useful to
implement a legalized dispute settlement process that could
culminate in the authorized withdrawal of concessions for
noncompliance because it would legitimize the imposition of
retaliatory sanctions in cases of noncompliance that were central to
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Thus, the United States was
careful to condition its support for legalization of dispute
settlement on the establishment of detailed, substantive
225
commitments that it supported.

In short, this could be considered classic hegemonic behavior. A
power state —and a powerful non-state—comply with a regime
because it embodies rules that promote their interests. A theory that
seems conspicuously absent from the discussions surrounding the
WTO is constructivism. There is very little in the public statements
that would indicate that adherence to the WTO was based on a real
sense of identity. While there are references to the importance of
promoting a regime of free trade, they seem to be couched in the
neoliberal understanding of the reciprocal benefits—even if only in
the long term—of such a regime. Strangely, there does seem to be at
least one outlier in this regard—Ukraine. As noted earlier, Ukraine
is not yet a member of the WTO, but has observer status with the
organization. At the 2003 ministerial conference, the Ukrainian First
Vice Minister and Minister of Finance argued that “[m]aintaining,
strengthening and developing the WTO system are pre-conditions for
further stable development of the world economy, which, in turn, will
form the basis for the future development of world society.”226 He
transatlantic powers agreed to that approach in 1990, the definitively dominated the
agenda-setting process, that is, the formulation and drafting of texts that would be
difficult to amend.
Steinberg, supra note 188, at 265 (internal citations omitted).
225. Id. at 250 (internal citations omitted).
226. Nykola Azarov, Statement by Ukraine at the World Trade Organization Ministerial
Conference, Fifth Session Cancún, WT/MIN(03)/ST/159 (Sept. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Statement
by Nykola Azarov].
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explained that “[t]he Doha Round documents stress that
liberalization is not an end in itself, but only an instrument to ensure
the stable [sic] consensual development of society and the
enhancement of the well-being of people in all countries of the
227
world.” In summary, therefore, it seems as though adherence to the
WTO regime is explained best by a combination of neoliberal
institutionalism and hegemonic stability theory.
D. The Kyoto Protocol
1.

Overview of the Treaty Regime

228
a. Background . With the objective of addressing climate
change, the negotiators of the Kyoto Protocol229 sought to create a
framework for intergovernmental efforts designed to reduce carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases thought to create global warming.
Despite some initial and continuing disagreement among key parties
as to specific emissions targets, enforcement mechanisms, and goals
for developing countries, the agreement was negotiated in December
1997, and went into force on 16 February 2005.230

b. Legal Obligations. Under the provisions of the Kyoto
Protocol, Annex I, states that have ratified the Protocol are expected
to cap emissions of greenhouse gases at roughly 95% of 1990 levels by

227. Id.
228. For a general discussion of the background of the Kyoto Protocol, see DAVID G.
VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL
WARMING 14 (2001); John F. Temple, Note, The Kyoto Protocol: Will it Sneak up on the U.S.?,
28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 213 (2002); see also Understanding Climate Change: A Beginner’s Guide
to the U.N. Framework Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, http://www.wwnorton.com/college/
chemistry/chemconnections/Warming/pages/begconkp.html.
229. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32, 40 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. The Protocol was thus additional
to the Convention, which was concluded in 1992. United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, June 20, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164 [hereinafter Framework Convention].
230. In order for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force, it required ratification by countries
representing at least fifty-five percent of the total CO2 emissions for 1990 of the thirty-eight
Annex I countries. Annex I countries are the developed countries subject to emissions ceilings.
They are established in Annex I to the Framework Convention. It lists the following states and
organizations: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada Czechoslovakia,
Denmark European Economic Community, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg , Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and United States of America.
Framework Convention, supra note 229, Annex I.
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2008-2012.231 As an intermediate step, each Annex I party was
expected, “by 2005, [to] have made demonstrable progress in
232
To facilitate
achieving its commitments under this Protocol.”
meeting these goals in the aggregate, the agreement proposed the
establishment of an emissions trading system in which states under
their respective quotas would sell their rights to other states needing
additional capacity. Such a system would benefit states like Russia
and Ukraine, whose economies collapsed after 1990, and would hurt
developing countries that had lower levels of production in 1990 but
had begun to develop and required fossil fuels.
c. Enforcement Mechanisms. The initial drafting of the Kyoto
Protocol did not address compliance and enforcement issues. Article
17 indicated that the first session of the Conferences of the Parties
(COP) would “approve appropriate and effective procedures and
mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance. . . .
Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding
consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this
Protocol.”233 Amendments, as indicated in Article 20, would require
approval by three-fourths of the parties, and the compliance
amendment would only be binding for those states that had ratified
the amendment.234 In other words, compliance enforcement with
‘binding consequences’ would not be a component of Kyoto.
All parties agreed that effective compliance is a sine qua non for
effectively reducing emissions, but agreeing on compliance
mechanisms proved to be a thornier issue. Finally, in 2001, four years
after the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol, parties agreed on a “penalty”
for non-compliance that increased the percentage by which a country
235
would be required to cut emissions. In spite of the agreement on

231. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 229, art.3(1).
232. Id. art. 3(2).
233. Id. art. 17.
234. Id. art. 20.
235. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh,
Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance Under the Kyoto
Protocol, 64, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (Jan. 21, 2002), available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/cop7/13a03.pdf; Compliance Under the Kyoto Protocol, COP 7 and the
Marrakesh Accords, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_mechanisms/compliance/items/3024.php
(last visited Mar. 8, 2006) (“If, at the end of this period, a Party’s emissions are still greater than
its assigned amount, it must make up the difference in the second commitment period, plus a
penalty of 30%. It will also be barred from ‘selling’ under emissions trading and, within three
months, it must develop a compliance action plan detailing the action it will take to make sure
that its target is met in the next commitment period.”).
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penalties for non-compliance, there are several problems with the
enforcement of these penalties. First, failure to pay the penalty in the
second control period (2013-2017) results in a new penalty for the
third control period.236 If the state was unable or unwilling to pay in
the first period, it would probably be less able or willing to pay once
an additional penalty was levied. Second, the penalty increases the
cost of participating in emissions reductions, which makes either
withdrawal or failure to ratify an amendment more likely. Lastly,
compliance is not legally binding except by amendment; those
countries unlikely to comply will also be those unlikely to ratify the
amendment.
The compliance regime designed to “facilitate, promote, and
enforce adherence to the Protocol’s commitments,” consists of a
237
Facilitative and Enforcement Branch. The former provides advice
and assistance intended to help parties meet their commitments, and
the latter determines whether an Annex I party has met its emission
target. If the Enforcement Branch finds a Party in non-compliance, it
will make a public declaration, including reference to any
consequences. The Party has a one-hundred-day window to enter
into compliance, possibly by trading emissions permits, and take
remedial action in the second commitment period. 238 Due to the
weakness of this arrangement for verification/enforcement, it can be
rated at the “low” level.
d. Effect on Sovereignty. Meeting the targets specified in Kyoto
requires enormous government commitment and sponsorship, since
reductions are set against a baseline year of 1990. For the United
States to meet its obligations of a seven percent reduction compared
to 1990, it would have to reduce its projected 2008 emissions by
239
Such reductions
twenty to thirty percent, an ambitious endeavor.
require some sort of domestic intervention, as the trend continues
upward. Suggested mechanisms include subsidies for industries to
research alternative fuels, for individuals to drive alternative-energy
vehicles, or for the government to purchase emissions rights from
other countries able to sell theirs. While some of these changes have
been suggested for purposes of clean air at the domestic level and

236. Statement by Nykola Azarov, supra note 226.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Congressional Research Service, Susan R. Fletcher, Global Climate Change Treaty:
The Kyoto Protocol, Order Code 98-2 (Mar. 6, 2000).

03__AREND.DOC

394

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

8/1/2006 3:02 PM

[Vol 16:331

energy independence, the ambitiousness of the reductions well
exceeds the pace at which governments would otherwise adopt these
measures. The consequence is an infringement on the policies of
domestic governments, an infringement of domestic autonomy.
States such as Russia and Ukraine, whose emissions levels are already
below 1990 levels, would not be required to modify energy practices,
meaning that their autonomy is not as impacted by ratification of and
adherence to Kyoto. All other states that have ratified must modify
domestic practices to be in compliance. It would thus seem that the
infringement upon the sovereignty imposed by the regime should be
classified as “high.”
e. Normativity. Even though there has been a growing
international concern about environmental degradation, the
normativity of the Kyoto Protocol does not seem to be particularly
high. Because there are many differences of opinion about the
science relating to climate change, it is difficult to conclude that there
is any kind of consensus about the moral value of the regime.
Moreover, because developing states are excluded from the
requirements of the Protocol, there has been a strong perception by
states such as the United States that the regime would operate in an
unfair, discriminatory fashion.240 As a consequence, it would seem
that the normativity of the regime should be valued at a “low” level.
2. Adherence Behavior. Given this analysis, states seem to fall
into three categories: high, medium, and low. Five states fall into the
high range: France, Germany, Japan, Ukraine, and the United
Kingdom. Three states fall into the medium range: Canada, Russia,
and South Africa. Eleven states fall into the low range: Australia,
Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan,
241
and the United States.
What makes the Kyoto Protocol different from the other treaties
is exclusion of some countries considered to be great or regional
powers. Annex I countries consist of mainly the European Union,
Russia, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States. Annex I
excludes developing countries, into which the negotiators placed
China, India, and Brazil, who are large and ever-increasing producers

240. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
241. This ranking is based on the authors’ examination of the states’ fulfillment of
provisions, institutional investment and domestic support for the overall provisions of the treaty.
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of greenhouse gases.242 It was the Annex I countries that were
required to ratify the treaty for it to enter into force. The EU states,
Canada, and Japan represented the early ratifiers of the treaty, all
signing it in 2002. Following this early set of ratifications, the treaty
stalled, requiring the ratification of either Russia or the United States
to enter into force. Russia ratified in November 2004 and the treaty
officially entered into force on February 16, 2005. Annex I countries
that have not ratified include Australia and the United States.
More interesting than ratification behavior, however, is behavior
with respect to other indicators of adherence. Since Kyoto requires
emission reductions between 2008 and 2012, it is impossible at this
time to assess fulfillment of provisions. It is, however, possible to
assess whether countries are on target to fulfill those provisions.
Countries that have been most successful in meeting emissions
reductions are the former Soviet Republics whose economies
243
collapsed after the 1990 disintegration of the Soviet Union. The less
productive economies have consumed less energy, naturally resulting
in lower emissions compared to the base year of 1990.244 Russia in
particular, an initial holdout to the treaty, eventually ratified it in
December 2004, recognizing that it would benefit from any emissions

242. These three countries have all ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Since they are not Annex I
countries, however, they are not subject to emissions limitations or reductions as are those states
in Annex I that have ratified. For a discussion on the Annex I states and exemptions for nonAnnex I countries, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). For a
discussion of the increasing emissions from developing countries, see Indrajit Basu, Greenbacks
Waft in with Greenhouse Gases, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Apr. 7, 2005, http://www.atimes.com/
atimes/South_Asia/GD07Df04.html.
243. Since fossil fuels are used as the energy base for economic development, there has
tended to be a direct relationship between economic development and greenhouse gas
emissions. Collapse of an economy would therefore be correlated with a dramatic decrease in
emissions, which has been the case for former Soviet republics or satellites. See, e.g., Alexander
Golub and Benito Muller, Kyoto’s Future Lies in Putin’s Hands, MOSCOW TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004,
at 8; see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: A
PRIMER 43-45 (2003), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/41xx/doc4171/04-25-ClimateChange.pdf.
244. Estonia, for example has seen reductions of 50.8% since 1990, Latvia a reduction of
58.5%, and Lithuania 66.2%; of the so-called former satellite states, the Czech Republic
reduced by 24.3%, Hungary by 31.9%, Poland by 32.1%, and Slovakia by 28.2%. See Annual
European Community Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990–2001 and Inventory Report 2003,
Submission to the UNFCCC Secretariat, European Environment Agency (May 27, 2005)
[hereinafter Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Inventory Report].
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trading scheme, as it would have credits to sell to other countries
245
requiring higher emissions.
Several other countries under consideration are successfully on
track to fulfill the treaty provisions and the country-specific targets of
Kyoto. The three big economic and political players of Europe—
Britain, France, and Germany—are on a trajectory to meet their
targets. Britain’s pollution is 13.3% less than the base year, France’s
is 1.9% less, and Germany’s 18.5% less. In the last couple of years,
emissions in these three countries have increased, in part because of
increases in coal-generated power production. Nonetheless, these
246
countries are on track to meet their 1990 levels.
Not every country that has ratified the treaty has projected a
fulfillment of provisions. Canada, which ratified on December 17,
2002, increased its emissions by fifteen percent between 1990-1999.
Even with climate change initiatives in place, Canada would still need
to reduce emissions by nineteen percent to meet its Kyoto target.
The likelihood that Canada will fail to fulfill the treaty provisions is
not the result of neglect. Since it agreed to participate in Kyoto,
Canada has committed billions of dollars and substantial government
energy to develop clean fuel technologies and encourage individuals
247
Reducing emissions while
and industry to reduce emissions.
undergoing economic and population growth has proven to be an
insurmountable challenge for Canada, which nonetheless appears to
be committed to the objectives of the treaty.248
Australia appears to have recognized the difficulty and economic
impracticality of ratifying the treaty and, as a result, has not done so.
245. Russia is the largest source of emissions credits due to its industrial collapse in the early
1990s. Patrick Brethour and Steven Chase, Ottawa Eyes Pricey Kyoto Credits, GLOBE AND
MAIL, Feb. 1, 2005, at A1.
246. These countries that are meeting their requirements have been offsetting the higher
emissions of EU countries such as Spain, which exceeds its 1990 targets by 40.6%, and Portugal,
which is over by 36%. Overall, the EU is still meeting its targets. See European Environment
Agency, http://reports.eea.eu.int/eea_report_2005_8/en/GHG2005.pdf (last visited Mar. 9,
2006).
247. Canada has also invested $500 million as part of its Action Plan 2000 on Climate
Change, which includes investment for new energy sources, adaptation research, and a better
understanding of the science underlying climate change. See generally the Canadian
Government’s website on the Action Plan, Moving Forward on Climate Change: A Plan for
Honouring our Kyoto Commitment http://www.climatechange.gc.ca/kyoto_commitments/
c2.asp#s4 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
248. National efforts to reduce emissions are captured in the state’s National
Communications submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
CANADA’S THIRD REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/natc/cannce3.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
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Australia, like Canada, has dedicated funding towards limiting and
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but “the Government also
decided not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol unless and until it is
demonstrated that it is in the national interest to do so.”249 Its
government considered that its reliance on cost-effective energy in
the form of fossil fuels, combined with the need to produce energy
intensive resources for export, has made substantial emissions
reductions counter to the nation’s economic interests. Until costeffective alternatives can be found, Australia has indicated it will not
be in a position to ratify. Nonetheless, Australia is committed to
funding research for alternative energy sources.250
The United States has also chosen not to ratify Kyoto. Following
the 1997 negotiated agreement in Kyoto, several U.S. senators
asserted their interest in expeditiously submitting the treaty for
ratification, knowing that the treaty would be voted down. President
Clinton knew he could not obtain two-thirds majority in the Senate,
but signed the treaty in November 1998. The Senate then voted
against the treaty, and President Bush sealed Kyoto’s fate by rejecting
the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, later stating that the Protocol
251
would have “wrecked the American economy.” The United States
has recognized the problem of climate change and committed
resources to better understanding the science behind it as well as
alternative energy sources, spending $1.7 billion on federal research
annually and providing $1 billion in climate change assistance to
developing countries over the last five years.252

249. Australia’s Third National Communication on Climate Change parallels that of
Canada’s and the other parties to the UNFCC, laying out the government’s commitment to
emissions reductions and enumerating the different ways that the government supports the
objectives of the treaty, whether through institutional investment or funding for research.
Australia has demonstrated its commitment to the treaty through a wide variety of governmentsponsored activities. See AUSTRALIA’S THIRD NATIONAL COMMUNICATION UNDER THE
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/natc/ausnc3.pdf [hereinafter AUSTRALIA].
250. Id.
251. Though President Bush has recently acknowledged the human contribution to global
warming, he continues to criticize the structure of the Kyoto Protocol, preferring technological
solutions rather than mandatory reductions, which he maintains would be a detriment to the
American economy. See Caroline Daniel & Fiona Harvey, Bush Admits to Role of Humans in
Global Warming, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at 8.
252. The United States, one of the few Annex I countries that has not ratified the treaty, has
been much maligned for its failure to do so. The government, however, asserts its commitment
to the treaty and outlines its policies for reducing emissions. See DEP’T. OF STATE, U.S.
CLIMATE THIRD NATIONAL COMMUNICATION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
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State behavior regarding Kyoto and the motivations for that
behavior have been variable. Certain adherence behavior is readily
explicable. India, Brazil, and China had every reason to ratify the
treaty, since doing so made them appear to be good global stewards
while not subjecting them to emissions reductions. Russia and
Ukraine also have obvious reasons for ratifying and fulfilling the
provisions. Since they experienced precipitous economic declines
after 1990, the base year used for Kyoto targets, they are in a position
to gain from any emissions trading scheme, as they would have extra
credits to sell, potentially amounting to $3 billion as part of an
emissions trading system.253 No institutional investment or domestic
embedding is required for these countries to meet their targets. This
set of countries is clearly rationalist, receiving the reputation benefits
of signing without undergoing any negative economic impacts
associated with implementation of alternative energy sources.
Australia and the United States have also made decisions based
largely on cost-benefit, realist calculations, but have cited different
aspects of the calculations. Australia has argued that its energy
export business requires a disproportionately large amount of energy
so it can provide energy to other countries with a lower capacity to
produce. The government has argued that “[b]y providing the world
market with energy-intensive products and less greenhouse-intensive
energy sources such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), Australia
displaces emissions that would otherwise occur in these markets.”254
The demand for fossil fuels is compounded by the decision not to use
nuclear energy and by insufficient availability of the type of water
needed for hydro-electric energy. Given these calculations, Australia
has determined that the treaty runs counter to its “national interest,”
as defined by economic interest, and will not ratify it.255
The United States is also concerned about the impact to its
economy, from both an absolute and relative perspective. Given its

CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/
ResourceCenterPublicationsUSClimateActionReport.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
253. The EU had realized that Kyoto would only enter into force if either Russia or the
United States ratified the treaty. Understanding that the United States was unlikely to sign, the
EU enticed Russia with WTO accession, to which it responded positively. WTO membership
along with an emissions trading scheme beneficial to Russia ultimately convinced the Russian
government that it should ratify Kyoto. For the business side of Kyoto from the perspective of
Russian ratification. See John Carey, Russia’s Path to Kyoto, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Oct. 1, 2004,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/oct2004/nf2004101_3878_db039.htm.
254. AUSTRALIA, supra note 249, at 2.
255. Id.
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heavy reliance on fossil fuels, the U.S. government has argued that
committing to reduce its energy consumption or to consuming
alternative sources would have negative repercussions on the
economy. President Bush, in citing Kyoto’s flawed emphasis on
emissions reductions rather than technology solutions as a basis for
his opposition, asserted: “I don’t see how you can be president of the
United States and agree to an agreement that would have put a lot of
256
people out of work.”
The U.S. Government has been wary of a
treaty associated with potential negative economic consequences.257
Any assessment of the absolute effect on America’s economy is
usually associated with the point that some of the U.S. competitors, at
least those in the future, are not also subject to fossil fuel reductions.
Specifically, India and China are among the world’s largest emitters,
but they have been exempted from the Kyoto requirements.
Defending the American criticism of Kyoto, President Bush noted,
“These and other developing countries that are experiencing rapid
growth face challenges in reducing their emissions without harming
258
Exemption for countries that are among the
their economies.”
largest emitters is thought to be unfair, putting a disproportionate
share of the responsibility and cost on developed countries. Realist
interest in maintaining a strong economy, particularly relative to
potential competitors, is clearly at stake.
Implicitly, the U.S. behavior is also explained by the hypotheses
laid out by hegemonic stability theory. Adherence to Kyoto, given
current U.S. emissions, would require dramatic changes to the
domestic energy infrastructure; the perceived inconvenience and cost
to meeting emissions reductions is thought to be high, leading the
259
Related to the realist
United States to oppose the treaty.

256. Daniel & Harvey, supra note 251, at 14. See also Bush arrives at Summit Session, Ready
to Stand Alone, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005 at A14.
257. Press Release, President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change (June 2001),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html
258. Id.
259. The United States Department of Energy has evaluated the potential costs of fulfilling
its Kyoto obligations. In its section called Comparing Cost Estimates for the Kyoto Protocol, the
study reports the following: “The estimates of unavoidable (irreducible) losses—income losses
that cannot be recovered—for the U.S. economy range from $32 billion (DRI Case 2) to about
$62 billion (EIA) in 2010. There are many frictions that can increase costs above the irreducible
minimum. These include business cycles, international trade and capital constraints, regulation,
use of imperfect instruments instead of auction permits, coal subsidies, CAFE standards,
exemptions, efficiency losses from taxation, etc.” ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
COMPARING COST ESTIMATES FOR THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, http://www.eia.doe.gov/
oiaf/kyoto/cost.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) (internal citations omitted).
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explanations, the United States is also concerned with maintaining
primacy and not being disproportionately constrained compared to
possible competitors. Concern with relative power and unrivaled
primacy are important U.S. policy objectives. The United States has
made it clear that it will develop policies around those objectives, thus
ruling out policies that give any advantage to potential rivals.260
The treaty status in light of non-ratification of the United States
also confirms hegemonic stability predictions that a treaty will be the
261
most effective if it has the sponsorship and backing of the hegemon.
While the Kyoto Protocol has technically entered into force because
of Russia’s ratification, it arguably still lacks teeth. Not only are India
and China not subject to the provisions of the treaty, but the United
States, which leads in emissions, is not a party. The treaty is
substantively less effective without the main emissions contributor,
and it is also less diplomatically effective. U.S. ratification would give
the Convention more leverage to bring developing countries on
board, and it would give the United States an opportunity to use its
leadership to that same end. Instead, the United States has withheld
its support, an act, which undermines the treaty’s effectiveness, but
which may ultimately cause the UNFCC to create a solution that
takes U.S. interests into account and that will garner U.S.
endorsement.262
While realist and hegemonic principles readily explain the
previous countries, they are less helpful in explaining the behavior of
European states such as Britain, France, and Germany. These

260. The 2002 National Security Strategy outlines the U.S. foreign policy objectives and
strategies that will be used to meet these objectives. The document states that the highest
priority is to defend the United States, which it can do best through “unparalleled strength” and
the dissuasion of future military competition, and the maintenance of defenses beyond
challenge. See Section IX. Transform America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the
Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century, NSS 2002, at 30.
261. Gilpin has discussed the influence of the hegemon on international order and stability,
using the examples of Britain and the United States to argue that the hegemon creates and
enforces international rules. Kindleberger has also written on the importance of a hegemon in
promoting international stability. Keohane has argued that the hegemon is important in
facilitating the creation of an international regime but may not be as important in the
perpetuation of that regime. See KEOHANE, supra note 50.
262. At a press conference jointly held with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on July 7,
2005, President Bush noted: “Now is the time to get beyond the Kyoto period and develop a
strategy forward that is inclusive not only of the United States, but of the developing nations,
and, of course, nations like Great Britain.” George Bush, U.S. President, Bush, Blair at G8 Call
for Post-Kyoto Strategy on Climate Change, Remarks by President Bush and Prime Minister
Blair at the 2005 G8 Summit in a Photo Opportunity (July 7, 2005) (transcript available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2005/Jul/08-375773.html).
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countries might be associated with mixed motives, a combination of
realist, constructivist, and modified structural realist behavior. The
European powers, particularly the United Kingdom, have enjoyed
greater energy consumption, increases in use of independent means
of transportation, and stronger economic growth, but still have been
able to reduce emissions. The difference has been a concerted
interest in lowering emissions, and a strong government commitment
to greater energy efficiency, pollution control measures in the
industrial sector, and a general restructuring of the energy supply
sector, with an emphasis on alternative energy sources.263 These
policies have increased the efficiency of energy usage, a positive
economic advantage and a positive result according to rationalist
cost-benefit calculations.
Adherence behavior, however, appears to be motivated by more
than just rationalist calculations. It seems to have an identity
component, particularly for the United Kingdom. The British
government consistently asserts its engagement in the climate change
debate, and its role in leading in international negotiations, and
working towards a solution to the global problem.264 There is a sense
that Britain conceives of itself as a global steward, leading in the goal
of global sustainable development. During the G8 Summit in July of
2005, hosted by Great Britain in Gleneagles, Scotland, Prime Minister
Tony Blair made climate change one of the two major issues on the
agenda.265 Despite the terrorist attacks in London that occurred
during the meeting, Blair returned to this issue in his press conference
266
following the Summit. From a constructivist perspective, Britain’s

263. The United Kingdom’s Third National Communication under the UNFCC captures the
policy changes responsible for emissions reductions, and the ideological commitment to
addressing climate change. U.K.’S THIRD NATIONAL COMMUNICATION UNDER THE UNITED
NATIONS
FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
available
at
http://www.defra.gov.uk/ environment/climatechange/pubs/3nc/pdf/climate_3nc.pdf (last visited
Mar. 9, 2006).
264. Id. at 5.
265. The other was aid to Africa.
266. Blair explained:
What I wanted to do therefore at this summit was establish the following, and I believe
we have done this. I wanted an agreement that this was indeed a problem, that climate
change is a problem, that human activity is contributing to it, and that we have to
tackle it; secondly, that we have to tackle it with urgency; thirdly, that in order to do
that we have to slow down, stop and then in time reverse the rising greenhouse gas
emissions; and finally, we have to put in place a pathway to a new dialogue when
Kyoto expires in 2012. And what we have agreed is a dialogue between the G8
countries and others, but most particularly the five that came to Gleneagles yesterday,
and that dialogue will be on how we confront and tackle this problem. It is combined,
in addition, with a specific plan of action in respect of all the main issues, and that plan
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strong adherence to Kyoto may reflect a deep-held belief that being a
leader in promoting a greener world may mirror British identity.
Defining itself as a leader for sustainable development may also
be the result of modified structural realist constraints. Since the
United Kingdom is less powerful compared to its historic position as a
world power, and has relied in recent years on U.S. power and
security guarantee. It has lost some of its global voice in security
affairs, but has found it in other issues dealing with lower politics,
including international development and environmental governance.
Taking the lead on issues such as climate change has given Britain a
267
voice opportunity that it may not have in the realm of high politics.
Britain uses the leadership role it is periodically offered, whether as
the rotating President of the EU or the chair of a G8 meeting, to
promote social and environmental responsibility. It appears that the
United Kingdom has determined that its influence in global affairs is
best used in areas of low politics, and that it may relinquish leadership
in the security arena to the United States.
3. Validation of Theories. In considering a general explanation
for patterns of state adherence to Kyoto, no clear theoretical winner
emerges. On some level, where a state sits is where it stands. The
United States, as the hegemon, seeks to preserve its position and is
unwilling to bind itself to a treaty that it considers disproportionately
costly compared to potential rivals. It is willing to hold out for a
treaty that is more compatible with its interests, in part recognizing
that a more effective treaty assumes hegemonic participation. This
behavior is also distinctly realist in that states do not want to sacrifice
domestic autonomy and are cognizant of relative gains and losses visà-vis other states. Australia, in addition to the United States, fits into
this category. It should be noted that Australia may be an outlier to

of action and the dialogue together will then be reported on, first of all at a meeting
that will be held here in Britain on 1 November, and then in successive G8
Presidencies. And the President of Russia has kindly agreed to put this on the agenda
for next year, and there will then be a full report back for the Japanese Presidency in
2008.
Tony Blair, U.K. Prime Minister, Presidency Press Conference at Gleneagles, (July 8 2005)
(transcript available at http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page7891.asp).
267. Robert Kagan addresses the different responsibilities of Europe compared to the
United States, arguing that that Europe’s tacit reliance on the U.S. security guarantee has
allowed European countries to consider the use of military force less often in favor of
diplomacy. One could make a similar argument about Europe’s ability to pursue issues of low
politics compared to high politics. See Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 113 POLICY
REVIEW 3 (2002), available at http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html.
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the positional framework laid out in this Article. The positional
argument would suggest adherence on the part of Australia. Instead,
Australia has chosen not to ratify or adhere in any meaningful way to
the provisions of the treaty. While it is difficult to explain Australia’s
behavior in light of the positional theory, it may be a case where its
relationship to the United States has carried over into its actions.
A second category includes states that require little sacrifice and,
in fact, gain through emissions trading and are willing to adhere. This
category include states such as Russia, Ukraine, and other former
Soviet Republics whose economies and emissions collapsed after
1990, and that can meet their targets without changing their domestic
status quo energy usage. Structural realism would predict this
behavior. The rationale is, since there is no real sacrifice, why not be
seen as a good state?
The third category, primarily the three most powerful states in
Europe, includes countries that have had to implement domestic
energy restructuring in order to cut emissions, and have proceeded to
do so.
These are countries that have made environmental
conservation a priority and have, to some degree, enjoyed voice
opportunities that they might not have garnered in the high politics
arena. Their behavior is best explained by a combination of modified
structural realism and constructivism, that is, identifying themselves
as environmental stewards.
IV. TOWARD A POSITIONAL THEORY OF ADHERENCE
A. Traditional Theories and Adherence: A Failure
As noted previously, both international relations scholars and
international legal scholars have debated at length over whether and
under what conditions states are likely to cooperate with
international regimes and have applied several traditional theories to
the issue. Unfortunately, when each of those theories is tested
through an examination of state behavior in the four treaty regimes
examined here, none seems to be able to predict adherence across
states.268 A realist approach explains some behavior—such as why
India and Pakistan would not adhere to the CTBT. But it does not

268. Professor Jack Snyder has similarly argued that “[t]heories of international relations
claim to explain the way international politics works and each of the currently prevailing
theories falls well short of that goal.” Jack Snyder, One World, Rival Theories, 145 FOREIGN
POLICY 52, 62 (2004).
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explain other behavior—such as why the U.S. would neither sign nor
ratify the CTBT and the Land Mine Treaty, but still adhere to many
elements of those regimes. Similarly, a modified structuralist
approach might be able to explain why certain European states would
seek voice opportunities in some regimes, but not why China would
demonstrate any adherence behavior with respected to the CTBT.
Neoliberalism would explain general behavior in the WTO, but not
why the U.S. would follow some of the provisions of the Land Mine
Treaty. Hegemonic stability theory goes a long way in explaining
U.S. behavior at the WTO and with respect to Kyoto, but not U.S.
actions regarding the Land Mine treaty. Perhaps constructivism
could explain all behaviors described above, but that may simply be
because constructivism in its current form allows for behavior that
realists, modified structuralists, neoliberals, and hegemonic stability
theorists would predict. Needless to say, a theory that allows for all
such behavior but cannot predict when such behavior will take place
is quite problematic.
In short, existing theories—as they are currently developed—fail
to explain the textured adherence behavior that can be observed in
these cases. They may offer fruitful explanations of some state
behavior, but cannot explain variances in state adherence behavior
within the same treaty, or why the same state will adhere differently
across different treaties. As a consequence, a new theory of
adherence is required.
B. A Positional Theory of Adherence
Our empirical work suggests that states’ approaches to
international law are determined in part by where they stand in
relation to other states in the international system and in part on the
basis of other factors associated with each treaty. If some of the
insights of the traditional theories are linked to the position of the
state, the contours of a new theory seems to emerge—what might be
called “a positional theory of adherence.” This theory relates the
position of the state to four other factors: (1) the high/low nature of
the regime; (2) the extent to which the regime infringes on state
sovereignty; (3) the nature of the verification/enforcement
arrangement of the regime; and (4) the normativity of the regime.
This theory can be summarized for each of the positions that we have
identified.
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1. The Hegemon. The global or regional hegemon is concerned
with maintaining its position of primacy. Doing so means not
subjecting itself to any unfair disadvantages vis-à-vis challengers,
being unfettered in its ability to defend itself, and being able to verify
and enforce compliance on the part of other states. It also means
leveraging its power to influence institutions and parties in a way that
returns benefits to itself. To this end, the hegemon will be more
likely to adhere to treaty in the area of low politics, with limited
infringement on its autonomy, and with credible mechanisms for
verification and enforcement.
Ceteris paribus, a hegemon will be unlikely to adhere to a regime
when there is weak normativity. If there is no significant consensus
behind the regime then it is unlikely that the state would demonstrate
any elements of adherence. The United States approach to the Kyoto
Protocol seems to fall into this category. Given the questions about
the science underlying climate change, perceptions about the
unfairness of the regime, and the unwillingness of other states to
adhere, it is no surprise that the United States would be reluctant to
sign, ratify or demonstrate any other indicators of adherence to the
regime. Conversely, if there is a stronger level of normativity, the
global hegemon might be expected to demonstrate a greater level of
adherence. The Land Mine Treaty and the CTBT illustrate this
behavior and are perhaps even more interesting. In both cases, the
United States has not ratified, but still adheres to many of the
provisions of both treaties and has expressed strong support for the
underlying purposes of the treaty regimes. It seems that this behavior
may be due to the strong sense of normativity of the regimes. As
noted earlier, land mines have come to be seen as “immoral,
abhorrent” weapons by virtually all states in the international system.
And there has always been a strong revulsion against nuclear
weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.269 In other words, the moral
efficacy of the regime would seem to pull the United States toward
adherence.
Different states may maintain the position of hegemon for
different issue areas. For example, on issues of high politics
(security), the United States is clearly the hegemon and approaches
international treaties accordingly. On some issues of low politics,
specifically in the economic realm, the European Union—whose total

269. See, e.g., TANNENWALD et al, supra note 75, at 433.
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economy is about the size of the United States’270—is a hegemon and
approaches international economic institutions accordingly.
Assessing State Behavior: The Hegemon
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2. The Partner. Compared to states in other positions, global or
regional partners tend to approach international treaties in the most
adherent manner, almost irrespective of the issue area. In many
cases, they fall under the extended deterrence umbrella of the United
States, a mechanism that mitigates the conditions of anarchy and
allows them to pursue cooperation, whether in the area of high or low
politics. In the area of high politics, these states have been able to
relinquish their pursuit of nuclear weapons development and can
readily ratify non-proliferation agreements; in addition, their more
limited global presence tends to mean that land mines are not a
necessary element of their defense posture, making it easier for these
states to adhere to the Land Mine Convention.
Since their defense needs have been addressed by the American
security guarantee, they may also be in a position to pursue
cooperation issues in the area of low politics. With the issues of
relative gains mitigated by the security guarantee, they are in a
position to harness the benefits of cooperation, including lower
transaction costs, greater efficiency, and greater absolute gains across
participants.
They may also perceive a regime’s normativity
270. For a useful comparison and projection of the European Union’s total economy vis-àvis the United States’, see, e.g., ADAM S. POSEN, THE BROOKINGS INST., FLEETING EQUALITY:
THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THE U.S. AND EU ECONOMIES TO 2020 (2004), available at
http://www.brook.edu/fp/cuse/analysis/posen20040901.pdf. If the analysis is correct and the
EU’s economic power decreases vis-à-vis the United States, our theory would suggest that the
EU would tend to approach economic treaties differently since it would no longer occupy a
hegemonic position.
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differently from the hegemon, seeking to adhere on the basis of a
regime’s moral imperative (e.g., Kyoto) and perhaps driven less by a
concern about relative fairness.
Lastly, states in this category tend to be smaller and less powerful
states that choose to exercise their influence through the “voice
opportunities” afforded by participation in the treaty. These
countries may be able to lead the institution forward in a way that
individually would be more difficult, which gives them additional
incentive to participate in the treaty regime. In keeping with these
incentives for participation, partners—including the European
countries, Canada, and Japan—seem generally to adhere to the
regimes.
Assessing State Behavior: The Partner
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3. The Competitor. According to the definition suggested
earlier, a global or regional competitor harbors rivalries with other
states but, depending on circumstances, may be able to reach higher
levels of adherence. Sovereignty issues are not as significant to these
states as to the hegemon or adversaries, and normativity is less
significant than for partners. The key condition for cooperation
appears to be confidence-building measures associated with the
treaty’s objectives. The case of Brazil and Argentina is the most
instructive here. Despite being historic competitors, they have
realized that there is some utility in a Lockean state of cooperation,
but the negotiations that have led to higher levels of adherence have
occurred primarily on a bilateral basis outside the regime.
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Within the regime, they are interested in enforcement and
verification of the other participants, but are also concerned with
fairness (normativity) and universalization of the treaties.
Presumably, these concerns are driven by the residual
competitiveness of the states; they are able to overcome their fear of
anarchy but only under the condition that other states—primarily
their competitor, but all states—are subject to the same constraints of
the treaty. They are willing to accept the terms of absolute gains, but
only if other states are playing by those same rules. In short,
adherence is more tenuous with competitor states, but the right
conditions can elicit cooperation.
Assessing State Behavior: The Competitor
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4. The Adversary. Lastly, global or regional adversaries
present the most pessimistic prospect for adherence, almost
independent of the issue area, credibility of enforcement, and
normativity; their goal is to maintain the highest possible degree of
autonomy (lowest infringement on sovereignty) in order to defend
themselves. These states seem to exist in a Hobbesian world of
constant distrust. As a consequence, they will be less inclined to sign,
ratify or adhere to the provisions of regimes that touch on issues
relating to the rivalry. Thus, Israel and its rival Arab states will not
be inclined to adhere to the CTBT due to the belief that this
agreement would unduly constrain behavior that might be necessary
for their security. The same can be said for India and Pakistan.
Almost no amount of negotiation, confidence building, or certainty
about enforcement can bring these states out of their constant
security dilemma.
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Since security is of paramount concern, a regime’s high degree of
normativity would still exert little adherence pull with regard to these
states. They may simply be apathetic towards issues that may distract
them from their goal of state survival. Adversaries may be interested
in economic cooperation, but only to the extent that it offers some
instrumental utility and minimizes disadvantageous trade situations.
Assessing State Behavior: The Adversary
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V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A POSITIONAL THEORY FOR
FOREIGN POLICY
What does this analysis mean for policymakers who design treaty
regimes and seek the fullest and broadest adherence from states?
How can they go about creating an effective regime that also brings in
the hegemon and regional partners or competitors, takes into account
principles of fairness, and mitigates concerns about relative gains and
the security dilemma?
A. The Hegemon
First and foremost, the hegemon’s support is important to the
development and sustainment of the treaty. While not every treaty
initiative must originate with the hegemon, obtaining the backing of
the hegemon is important for several reasons. First, the hegemon
may be disproportionately responsible for the problem that the treaty
addresses. In the case of climate change, the United States accounts
for 25% of greenhouse emissions. Pragmatically speaking, the
transnational problem of climate change requires the large
contributors, which certainly includes the United States. Second, the
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hegemon has the ability to influence other states into supporting the
treaty, both through its actions and through the incentives it offers
271
It may have more leverage than other states in the
other states.
international system, positioning it to bring other states off the
sidelines and into the treaty. Third, the hegemon’s abstinence from
the regime may at best be benign but at worst could actually
undermine the regime. Perhaps one of the most notable examples
was America’s unwillingness to join the League of Nations following
the First World War. Without U.S. participation, the organization
was doomed to be an ineffective collective security body.
The hegemon’s support may be constructive to the regime, but
presents a challenge to the policymakers developing the treaty. On
the one hand, it may benefit and preserve hegemonic power to
project its influence through institutions, which creates an incentive
for participation in the regime.272 On the other hand, as the accounts
of hegemonic activity suggest, the hegemon’s desire to maintain
primacy may impede its participation in particular regimes. A
hegemon that perceives the regime as antithetical to its security or
economic interests will be less inclined to ratify, and the international
community may not have the power to coerce ratification, as it might
with smaller states. Several options exist in this case. The
international community could wait for the right composition of
domestic political actors.273 It may do nothing, hoping that the treaty
will be sufficiently effective without the U.S. support, which is largely
what the UNFCC has done with regard to Kyoto. The international
community may also choose to take the hegemon’s reservations into
account in a modified treaty, as in the Law of the Sea, where states
271. Hegemonic international law claims that “in terms of the formation of customary law,
such a power can by its abstention prevent the emerging rule from becoming part of custom.”
Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843, 847 (2001). A similar
case could be made for the hegemon’s behavior with respect to treaty law: abstention, or
conversely, participation, can influence the broader rejection or acceptance.
272. Some scholars have argued that the United States has created an “institutional
bargain” with secondary states, in which the United States provides public goods, largely
through institutions, in exchange for acquiescence from potential challengers. In this
framework, the participation and leadership in regimes serves to preserve the power and
primacy of the hegemon. See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY passim (2001).
273. Since the last opportunity for ratification of the CTBT was defeated only by a vote of
51-48, ultimate ratification by a different political composition within the Senate might be
plausible. Alternatively, it may also suggest an isolationist undercurrent in U.S. foreign policy
in which the United States retrenches rather than engages the international system. See, e.g.,
Gerard Baker & David Buchan, American Isolationism Put to the Test: Rejection of the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty Demonstrates How World Issues are Pushed to the Fringe of U.S. Politics, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at 23.
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recognized that without U.S. support, the treaty would largely be
ineffective. Alternatively, the hegemon may circumvent the treaty
and create a separate multilateral regime designed to effect similar
change, but through different means, as the United States has done
with its climate change initiative. Ideally, the hegemon would support
in the development, adherence, and enforcement of the regime. In
less than ideal situations, the community may find itself resorting to
these other policy options.
B. Partners, Competitors, and Adversaries
One of the most prominent adherence patterns to emerge
throughout this analysis is that countries act in concert with regional
partners, competitors, or adversaries. This pattern presents several
implications for policymakers hoping to gain the broadest
participation. Some regions, such as Europe, appear to have
overcome the impediments to effective cooperation. The behavior of
those states suggests that they are not driven by relative gains but
rather by the absolute gains of cooperation. At least temporarily,
they have been able to mitigate the security dilemma and act in
concert toward early ratification and continuing adherence behavior.
European states benefit individually from absolute gains but also
collectively from the voice opportunities they attain from
participation in regimes, so their adherence is rational and beneficial
to the strength of the regime. That said, European support alone is
not the necessary and sufficient condition for global regime strength.
Policymakers should recognize that the condition of anarchy
creates challenges for cooperation in most countries, particularly
states that are not global great powers, but are regional competitors.
Brazil and Argentina have traditionally vied for regional hegemony in
South America. Israel, Egypt, and Iran vie for regional hegemony in
the Middle East; and India and Pakistan in south Asia. Unless these
regional competitions can be addressed, the limits to cooperation—at
least in the security arena—will be prohibitively high. As indicated
previously, Brazil and Argentina have worked bilaterally to overcome
some of those limitations at the multilateral level, but other states are
still too steeped in recent competition to benefit from fruitful
cooperation. Policymakers must somehow break or at least mitigate
the security dilemma of these regions if they intend to improve
adherence, particularly in the security arena.
Developing adherence pull is the most difficult with regard to
adversarial states. Although institutions are meant to increase
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transparency, these states are often bound by the security dilemma to
be convinced of any benefits of cooperation. Having said that, one
way to build confidence in the regime is to create a more robust
transparency, verification, and enforcement regime, which might help
mitigate the security dilemma by exposing the motivations and
activities of their adversaries. Israel has maintained that its nonadherence to regimes such as the CTBT stems from its skepticism in
the transparency of other states’ behavior and in the enforcement
regime in general. One way to build confidence in the enforcement
might be to continue to fortify the IMS, which would require
additional funds for international monitoring stations, but might
increase the credibility of the regime’s transparency and regime.
Another option for addressing the regional security dilemma is
through hegemonic leadership, which presupposes hegemonic
support for the regime itself. If the United States were to support the
CTBT, for example, it might use its leverage and influence to create
separate side payments in exchange for the ratification by India and
Pakistan. Offering its satellite reconnaissance as a confidence
building measure, creating economic incentives, and tying adherence
to resource transfers might be effective ways of gaining participation
from these states and perhaps breaking the adherence deadlock
274
within the region.
In sum, different states’ positions will create different challenges
for policymakers hoping to gain the broadest levels of adherence.
Thus understanding a state’s position and motivations may help
inform efforts to draft a treaty likely to elicit adherence. In this sense,
the fairness principle is very much linked to the way positions
motivate state behavior. States’ conceptions of fairness will be based
in part on how they perceive the treaty to affect others vis-à-vis
themselves. In other words, fairness is relative, assessed by one state
relative to its partners, competitors, or adversaries. A treaty that
disproportionately impacts Pakistan compared to India may be
perceived by India to be unfair even if at the same time the treaty
favors Brazil, which would have no impact on India’s influence in
274. In the recent agreement on civil nuclear cooperation between India and the United
States, the United States acknowledged India’s status as a nuclear weapons power and agreed to
transfer nuclear technology to India in exchange for India agreeing to accept additional
inspections and tighter nuclear controls. If the U.S. itself were more committed to the CTBT, it
could easily have tacked the CTBT onto the bilateral exchange, and worked in parallel with
Pakistan to gain their commitment to the regime. See, e.g., Caroline Daniel & Demetri
Sevastopulo, Nuclear Deal with India Spells Division in Washington, FIN. TIMES, July 27, 2005,
at 10.
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south Asia. Similarly, the United States’ concern with China’s global
position suggests that the United States will consider fairness and its
own adherence in part vis-à-vis China’s behavior. Fairness as judged
from the vantage point of a state’s position in the international or
regional system is indeed a real concern for states evaluating their
adherence policies and must fall squarely on the agenda of
policymakers constructing international treaty regimes.
CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset, the purpose of this Article has been to
explore the motivations of global and regional powers regarding their
adherence behavior toward four major treaty regimes. We believe
that this examination has demonstrated that a new theory, what we
have called a “positional theory of adherence,” provides a more
textured explanation of state behavior than the traditional theories of
international relations and international law. In particular, we
believe that this study leads to several conclusions.
First, state adherence is not an either/or proposition. Rather,
there is a spectrum along which adherence takes place. Even some
states that do not sign or ratify an international agreement may
nonetheless demonstrate various levels of adherence to the treaty
regime. This is a fact that much of the “compliance” literature seems
to miss.
Second, while there is no scientific method for determining the
precise level of adherence, there do seem to be a number of factors
that can be used to evaluate the nature of adherence. These factors
include the extent to which the state follows the provisions of the
agreement, the degree of institutional investment, the domestic
embedding of the treaty provision, the willingness to accept dispute
settlement procedures, and the extent of participation in any
conferences or negotiations that relate to the agreement.
Third, even though all traditional theories of international law
and international relations are able to explain some state behavior
some of the time, none succeed in explaining state behavior across all
four treaty regimes examined in this article. A positional theory
hypothesizes that adherence behavior can be understood by
examining the position of a state in the global or regional system as it
relates to the nature of the regime, the degree to which the regime
infringes on sovereignty, the verification/enforcement arrangements
of the regime, and the normativity of the regime. While this theory is
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not perfect275 and still requires further development, we believe that it
offers a great advance over previous approaches to compliance.
Fourth, a positional theory has important implications for
policymakers. With an understanding of what motivates states in
different positions, policymakers will be better equipped to determine
which diplomatic levers to pull if they seek to secure state adherence
to a particular regime.
Fifth, by selecting treaties in the area of high and low politics,
with higher and lower levels of infringement on sovereignty,
verifiability, and normativity, we believe we have represented the
different types of treaties in the international system. As such, we
suggest that the methodology used herein can readily be applied to
other treaties to better understand the motivations and propensity for
different states’ adherence behavior. This analysis therefore provides
a methodological framework that may be applied beyond the four
treaties examined in this article, offering an analytical tool for both
international relations and legal scholars. It is our hope that scholars
in both disciplines will be able to develop this theory further as they
apply it to different treaty regimes and even customary international
law.
Finally, we believe that using official statements of policymakers
has provided a useful method for understanding state motivation.
The next step for subsequent research should involve the use of a
variety of techniques to measure the motives for adherence. While
we have focused on public statements by decision-making elites, other
scholars may have access to declassified materials, interviews of
participants, and other sources to assess state motives. As indicated
earlier, while no method will be able to provide a perfect view into
the minds of policymakers, the more lenses that a scholar uses, the
more likely it is that a better picture of state motivation will be
developed.

275. As noted earlier, Australia does not behave as the theory would predict with respect to
the Kyoto Protocol. As with any attempt to develop a theory of state behavior regarding
international legal regimes, the more cases that are examined using this approach, the more the
theory can be refined. For a more detailed discussion of methodology and the refinement of
theory, see GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL
INQUIRY 25 (Princeton Univ. Press 1994).

